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The recent decade has experienced two rather substantial food price spikes. This
thesis sets out to provide an in-depth look at the recent food price increases by achieving
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Chapter 1: Introduction
―Here at home, just as in the third world, hunger is an outrage precisely because it
is profoundly needless‖ (Lappe 1998).

World hunger beats its way into the rhythm of humanity, a constant to the point of
reliability in a universe where the only thing that is certain is uncertainty. In the recent
past food prices have increased to record highs. Food price volatility stresses the most
vulnerable groups. 925 million people do not have enough to eat and 98 percent of them
live in developing countries (FAO 2010). These high food prices are starving
development, quite literally. Long-run trends in food prices are not the only increases we
have encountered. Encompassing all the factors known to influence food prices, then
singling out the abnormalities of the past decade hints us towards explaining the
distortions away from food price trends. What exactly is behind these recent food price
increases? Everything we are seeing in terms of food prices are not new to the past
decade, yet the occurrence of food price spikes has increased. What are the driving forces
creating volatile food prices?
This thesis sets out to provide an in-depth look at the recent food price increases
by achieving two goals: assessing the forces driving food prices, and determining the
magnitude of those forces. These goals are reached by reviewing selected rhetoric on the
recent food price increases, analyzing case studies, and lastly determining our modeling
capabilities in decomposing food price changes. Additionally this thesis will serve as a
tool for stakeholder's to better address critical policy issues surrounding food, agriculture,
and energy policies.
Chapter 1.1: Background
When we say food prices have increased in the recent past, what do we mean? It
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becomes exceedingly necessary to diagnose the statement further. Perhaps we are merely
experiencing inflation, and the seemingly widespread panic is unnecessary. Our approach
also suggests this to be a negative. Assuming food price increases are negative without
discussion would be a bias. It is now imperative to take a look at historical food prices,
adjust our analysis for inflation, and then continue on with diagnosing our original
statement's implications.
Taking a look at the FAO's statistics we are presented with figure 1.1, indicating
international food prices in 2011 have reached levels higher than those seen in the 2008
spike. The value of the index in February of 2011 was 236, which was an all-time high.
Commodity prices saw up trends and volatility from 2010 to 2011, except these indices
cannot rule out attributing these price increases solely to inflation. We should turn our
attention to real data; figure 1.2 displays the FAO's international food price index in
nominal and real terms. The trend, as expected shows food prices in 2011 spiked
significantly.
FIGURE 1.1: FAO Food Price Indices

FIGURE 1.2: FAO Food Price Index

―This is the highest level (both in real and nominal terms) since FAO started measuring
food prices in 1990. Prices of all monitored commodity groups registered strong gains in
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January, except for meat, which remained unchanged‖ (FAO 2011). With prices reaching
these record highs after a spike just 3 years ago, it's not likely the two incidents are
mutually exclusive. Another point of interest becomes the correlations between the 2008
spike and now the more recent 2011 spike. As we continue our process of decomposing
the price increases, special attention should be taken to relating back to 2008 price rise
conditions. After all, if history repeats itself, a gap of only 3 years could be cause for
concern. Yet this again leans towards a position of food price increases being inherently
negative.
Chapter 1.2: The Good Vs Bad Debate
Pressing us further into the issue of proving these particular food prices are
negative. Saying food price increases are inherently bad is a fallacy. As with every
economic issue, the answer remains: it depends. Yes, we have reached that mantra.
Calling it a food crisis alone predisposes people to believe it is bad. However, there are
arguable upsides to increases in the price of food. The economist held a debate back in
July of 2008 discussing just this, ―There is an upside for humanity in the rise of food
prices‖ (The Economist, 2008). The proposition resting on the increases serving as
incentives for desperately needed agriculture investments, dictated the fundamentals of
higher prices drawing out higher production. Building from there the protagonist, Mr.
Homi Kharas, made some strong valid points, ―The reality is that the impact of high food
prices depends on each household's income and consumption patterns...the impact also
depends on what happens to labour, land and credit markets‖ (The Economist Debates
2008). And so we are entrapped to our mantra once again. Or are we?
Despite the propositions efforts of capitalizing on the food increases being a
solution to the initial problem of food scarcity in the long run, we are stuck here in reality
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and not a principles textbook. Worldwide the food increase has left the poorest of people,
the ones spending large portions of their income on food, with lower real incomes. Now
they are not only faced with malnutrition, but are spending less on education, health care,
sanitation, and clean water. An impact by development studies we know to be a
dangerous and multiplying one. Access to social protection in developing countries is
limited at best. The poor then are selling their productive assets off, making this a
downward spiral of attempting to not starve, and sacrificing their welfare (Apergi and
Rezitis, 2011).
In essence we have a realization that increased food prices in the short run
exploits the imperfections within the food markets and offhandedly creates an incentive
for solutions. Decidedly the food price increase is then a negative by virtue of its overall
impact being an on average and widespread problem that requires immediate attention.
The upside to increased food prices is based on the optimism of their being some just out
of reach agricultural technology, and/or policy fixes to create a balance in the food
markets. The likelihood of the 2008 and now 2011 food price spikes being the marginal
push that agriculture markets needed for investments and ultimately a boom in production
seems slim.
According to the FAO's October 12th report on Crop Prospects and Food Situation,
production has increased, except they expect the economic slowdown to be the culprit of
future price decreases and global food security remains uncertain. The increase in
production not being the result of tapping the untapped potential housed in agriculture
markets around the world. It did not come from higher yields, but rather cultivation of
more land. High food prices resulting in a sustainable increase in production would be
cause for reconsidering the negative stigma of our food price increase. However, this has
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not been the case. It is then the volatility in food prices that are causing concern; ―food
inflation spiked so quickly, up 50% in 2008 households couldn't have had time to respond
efficiently‖ (FAO, 2011). 40 percent of the world's population earns a living by producing
food (Westhoff 2011).Who does the recent price spikes help? If food price increase is
good for farmers, some of the poorest people throughout the world are farmers; this could
combat the negative stigma.
Except the price increases are not reaching farmers. The farmers‘ share of the
consumer food dollar has declined. For the US, ―In the early 1970s, the farmers‘ share of
the consumer food dollar was 32 to 35%. Today, the farmers‘ share of the retail food
dollar is down to only 20%‖ (Alexander 2008). Farmer's profits are not higher, increased
costs of inputs has made sure of this. Not to mention the pricing pressures farmers face
by large distributors. Farmers in developing countries do not have the market position to
benefit from the increased prices. Poor farmers are not the ones seeing the increase, and
poor consumers are starving because of it, development altogether takes steps backwards.
During a time of low prices these farmers are suffering as well, again because of
the market's imperfections. When food prices are low, rural and developing nation's
farmers are out-competed by modern industrial agriculture. More so, they lack the access
to capital to compete effectively. These practices are leading to institutions like the FAO
and OECD to conclude the constant negative outlooks for developing nation farmers. The
prices are high or the prices are low, the outlook for the developing nation's farmers
remains negative. Sure, in theory a food price increase that is sustainable, may add to
investments in agriculture and increase productivity, consequently production, but the
imbalance of the markets are what lead to the negative stigma surrounding agriculture.
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Adding to the negative stigma, the food security concerns that come with price
increases of food tend to disrupt the social stability of developing countries; threatening
the economic recovery as well as creates violence within the social realm. We see a
continuing loss of purchasing power; more and more people are desperate for survival. As
a result food protests have broken out around the world. Violence over food security has
broken out in Egypt, Jordan, Haiti, Tunsia, Algeria, Yamen, Morocco, and Mozambique.
Food price increases bring about turmoil and pushed millions into poverty. Threatens the
future livelihood and practices surrounding agriculture (Ortiz 2011). Life as we know it
cannot be sustained with our current status quo. As such recent food price increases are,
at the very least, threatening, and a force for change. It is an environmental stimulus to
which we have for the most part reacted poorly. At the risk of not getting caught up
further in the debate, this will suffice as our evidence that the recent food inflation, and
it's volatile nature, are negative for humanity (World Bank1 1990, 2008).
Chapter 2: Elements Affecting Recent Spikes in Food Prices
Identifying the influential elements affecting food prices strengthens stakeholder's
abilities to make more effective decisions. Consulting the literature lead to 7 fundamental
elements, these are: supply shocks, demand shocks, macroeconomic factors, policy
inadequacies, market structure, and unstable global financial markets. Under these 7
fundamental elements exists a series of influential factors driving food prices. A
breakdown of these fundamental elements can be found in the Chart in Appendix E. The
influential factors within each of the fundamental elements are mentioned below.
Supply shocks come in the form of adverse weather conditions, land availability,
water availability, climate change, input price increases, and low productivity. Demand
shocks are found in two large forms. The first shock is biofuel demand, and the second,
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income growth in emerging markets. Macroeconomic factors include inflation, real
public deficit, real money supply, the real exchange rate, and financial speculation. Policy
inadequacies encompass a large collection of international policies surrounding food,
agriculture, and energy. Examples include biofuel policies, trade policies, fiscal and
monetary policies, policies of abundances, policies of shortages, WTO goals, high export
tariffs, export bans, and CAP reform. Market structure brings up poor logistics systems,
energy intensity of agriculture sector, weak institutions undermining production
incentives, subsidies, and market inelasticity. Lastly the fundamental element of unstable
global financial markets remains largely self-explanatory. Global economic turmoil
nested within the financial markets has had its effects on food price volatility.
All these factors together sum to the environment surrounding food prices, and as
such leaves us a very daunting task of deciphering just how strong of an influence these
forces are. Furthermore should we choose to quantify them, do the modeling capabilities
available allow us such liberty, or are we limited in the scope our analysis can take? In
the following chapters each fundamental element and its influencing factors will be
drawn out into more detail. Beyond that a few case studies help us examine the
magnitude of the forces affecting food price increases. Lastly we investigate the modeling
abilities available.
Chapter 3: Supply Shocks
Simply put, someone could say the recent food price increase is a result of supply
not meeting demand. This would in principled economic fashion result in a price
increase. However, simple is left in our principle courses cushioned with assumptions
separating us from reality. Regardless, the complexities do have to start somewhere. Thus
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here we are, explaining the Supply utilization shocks contributing to an increase in food
prices.
As mentioned earlier, adverse weather conditions, land availability, water
availability, climate change, and low productivity serve as the supply shocks we are
seeing in 2010-2011. The forces driving prices are then not entirely mere short term, and
extend to a much larger issue of resource utilization. Taking the price increases of food
into a much more gloomy outlook on the status of our planet. Understanding that all of
the price drivers are linked, interactive, and correlated, lets us momentarily
compartmentalize the supply shocks we have run into over the past couple of years.
Chapter 3.1: Adverse Weather Conditions
It's no stranger to the news the amount of adverse weather conditions farmers are
being faced with around the world. Since day one, farmers have fallen captive to natural
disasters. There is little in our power as humans for us to fight these inevitable turns of,
well some could term it fate. Perhaps that seems a less human approach as of late than
any. Indeed evidence would suggest the contrary, we are the ones causing these fateful
turns of events. You can argue to what degree as much and for as long as you would like,
but there is simply no denying that human use of resources has had an impact on the
environment. Resources dictate our capabilities, and it is a cause for concern the changes
we are seeing in the patterns of our world's resources. One pattern in particular over the
past couple of years has added complications to the world's food supply, weather patterns.
Weather has taken its toll on the world's food supply. Table 3.1 lists recent
extreme weather conditions between June and December 2010. Droughts in Russia lead
to a decrease in grain productions by 35-37 percent. The drought reduced production for
other crops as well; sunflower seeds, potatoes, fodder grass, and vegetables all saw
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TABLE 3.1: Extreme Weather Events Between June and December 2010

Source: U.S. National Climactic Center

decreases in production. The dryness became so severe that fires became a very series
problem. The drought's impact led Russian leaders to put an export ban on wheat in an
effort to allow their depleted supplies and stocks to meet domestic demand (USDA1
2010). Russia banning wheat exports springs us into a little taste of the policy issues
surrounding the food price increases. Since they were once the second largest exporter of
world grains, global grain prices reflected their policy change. However, sticking with
our discussion of weather droughts decreased production in other parts of the globe as
well.
The black sea region saw its fair amount of adverse weather this past year.
Droughts and coastal flooding led to the depletion of stocks in the black sea region.
France and Germany experienced some severely dry weather; this has not gone unnoticed
in the quality of their crops, if not the production itself. The Ukraine and Kazakhstan also
suffered from the drought. Famine struck West Africa ruining crops in parts of Uganda
and Djibouti, but mainly the stretch of land where the borders of Kenya, Somalia, and
Ethiopia meet. South America and the Midwestern US saw the effects of La Nina, dryer
than normal temperatures. Canada saw excessive rain; parts of the US also saw severe
flooding. Heavy rains were not limited to North America; Australia also experienced crop
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damage from their rains. Bad weather all across the globe added to the price increases of
food (IISS 2011).
These droughts and famines however were not completely unexpected, aid
agencies warned governments of the probability of a future famine. Yet Governments did
not take the precautions necessary to safeguard against the effects following such
droughts. Stocks are being depleted not only in the country's experiencing the droughts,
but as well as in the major importers of the commodities taking the production shortfalls.
Countries are now forced with replenishing stocks to mitigate their vulnerability in the
future, as well as to meet current demands without depleting their stocks down to
dangerously low levels. A few of the major buyers include: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,
Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, and Libya (UPI 2011).
These countries are experiencing food emergencies. The buying up of stocks is
not going to mitigate their issues overnight. Figure 3.1 helps put into perspective the long
term consequences of adverse weather conditions and riots resulting from food price
hikes. Some food emergencies, according to the FAO are expected to last over 20 years.

FIGURE 3.1 Duration of Current Food Emergencies (years)
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Let's not limit our weather conditions to affecting crop yields. Livestock and
poultry are endangered or have difficulties growing properly when weather doesn't
cooperate. Cows may produce less milk, chickens lay less eggs. Cattle feeding on dryer
lands will not gain weight as well. Regardless, weather remains a powerful force
affecting prices. It is the main reason for changes in crop yields from year to year.
Technology changes are not implemented fast enough. Tillage, fertilization, seeds,
pesticides, and weed control all affect yields as part of the production process. However,
these changes are minimal in yield outcomes compared to the effect of heavy rains,
droughts, rain at the wrong time.
Then again yields can see large increases with favorable weather as well. Rain
during the right stage in crop growth can mean a better harvest, happier cows. ―In 2004,
near-perfect weather led to record grain crops in the United States, the E.U., and the
world as a whole‖ (Westhoff, 2011). Corn yields per acre in the US for 2004 were almost
13 percent higher than the old record yields. World cereal production went up by almost
10 percent largely as a result of higher yields per acre. Even with increased grain
consumption in 2004, the higher yields allowed replenishing of global grain stocks. These
came in handy in 2010/2011 with droughts in East Africa, East Asia, and Southern United
States, as well as with floods in Central America, Australia, South Asia, and South Africa.
Consequently this same cushioning method has to be sustained. Depletion of world
stocks presents as another factor pressuring food prices.
In the end there is no denying the link between weather and food prices is a strong
one. Granted there are ways of preparing, hence stockpiling, and genetic modifications.
Food production is then attracted to suitable land with sufficient water resources.
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Limiting the exposure to bad weather translates into limiting the risks of lower crop
yields, creating food security for a country, or as most food production ventures go
increasing profits.
Chapter 3.2 Land Availability
Land is one of the utmost important elements regarding agriculture. It is
imperative to discuss two issues surrounding land: people's access to land, and surges in
the demand for land. Efforts to maintain protectionist policies and fight food price
volatility have lead many countries to purchase or lease land in developing countries,
outsourcing their food production. Investors from the private sector and OECD member
countries bring money and infrastructure to rural farming communities. This could result
in employment opportunities, technological advancements, except it tends to bring added
competition for land and water resources to regions already struggling with attaining
these resources. Smallholder farms are being alienated in their rights and controls over
land in their rural communities. The demand for agro-fuel brings commercial agendas to
rural developing nations.
Multinational companies gain access via joint ventures, or by contracting local
farmers. Increasing incentives, some nations have changed laws in order to compliment
the investments. However, the additional capital flows heading into the rural communities
are not necessarily leading to benefits of the smallholder farms, or community members
in general. In Tanzania, an investment to plant Jatropha in the Coast Region of the
Kisarawe District sparked ―allegations that the villagers were not consulted and their
compensation was not adequate‖ (S. Haralambous 2009).
Not all investments have trended to negative allegations. For the most part the
investments have not been monitored completely and are just in the beginning phases. So
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many countries are jumping on board, and outsourcing their agriculture production.
Brazil has invested in Caribbean, African, and even Pacific countries. Media touts the
rural communities are not being displaced, and compensation measures are being taken.
However, this may be difficult to maintain once you are reaching higher and higher levels
of foreign investment. For example, applications for land by foreign investors in
Mozambique were over twice the total area of land cultivated in the country (V. Songwe
2009). Although, not all the applications were approved it‘s just an idea of the massive
amounts of foreign demand for developing country land.
Delving further into the outsourcing food production, the Philippines has a
Spanish bio-diesel company, Bionor Transformacion S.A. Buying up over 100,000
hectors for Jatropha plantation (Palawan Sun 2008). Also investing in Jatropha crop land,
50,000 hectares in Mindanao went to Sarangani Bio Corporation, a company consisting
of South Korean, Philippians, and Japanese investors (Renewable Energy Magazine
2008).
In the interest of food security, Gulf States are making deals to acquire land.
Private and public firms from the United Arab Emirates were reported to have invested in
the Baluchistan Province of Pakistan, where they plan to perform mechanized farming
under irrigation (S. Khan, 2008). Hail Agricultural Development Company, a private
Saudi Arabia company has invested in the north of Karthoum (W. Wallis 2009). Plans to
grow basmati rice in the Indonesian islands of Paupa, Sulawwesi and Western Java have
been made by The BinLadin Group (Grain 2008). Ventures by Saudi Arabia are not
limited to rice but also include larger projects geared towards agrofuels using maize, soy
beans, sugar, and sorghum. 240 Saudi companies obtained investment licenses in
Ethiopia, intent on growing cereals (M. Chebsi 2008). State Trading Corporation along
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with 15 Indian companies leased 10,000 hectares in Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay
growing soybeans and oil seeds (D. Sharma 2008). The list goes on, and on. Countries
are investing in land all over, snatching up the productive resource creating the new
frenzy termed, ―land grabbing‖.
Of course some would like to create a much more positive light on the land
grabbing situation and cite the investments bringing financial resources, agricultural
technology, and improving infrastructures in the developing world. Only, on average,
even in large scale this is not the reality we are faced with. In theory there is the
possibility for a ―win-win situation‖. Unfortunately lack of regulation on these foreign
investments, issues of control over the land, water availability, and the environmental
impact of mechanized agriculture projects all contribute to sticky situations for the local
communities involved. It is argued that the additional production found through the
outsourcing is necessary to meet world demands.
Saudi Arabia and China have invested in land in Africa. Rather than selling the
production to Africa states, they are using the production as an alternative to trading with
Africa. Taking profits and production space away from the already hurting African states.
Not to mention the demand for land being driven by biofuel production, the use of crops
in Africa for biofuel do not help with the problems of food security in Africa. Saudi Star
Agricultural Development Plc, owned by billionaire Sheik Mohammed Hussein AlAmoudi, plans to produce wheat in the Gambela region of Ethiopia then export the
essential food source. Currently the company is growing rice on 10,000 hectares. Yet he
plans on expanding his investment to 250,000 acres and agreed to only export 60 percent
of production, which Al-Amoudi sees as helping the local communities by way of foreign
currency, job creation, and increased domestic food production (Sisay 2011).
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Unfortunately the story doesn't end with the opportunities, arable land being sold or
leased out to foreign investors has many consequences. Some investors are simply not
producing anything on their land, and are just capitalizing on the increases in land prices
that have coincided with the land grabbing outbreak (Kersting 2011).
Land is becoming more and more of an issue, scarcity and degradation brought on
by climate change and demographic pressures make the increase in demand rather
complicated. To paint the picture more clearly there is an estimated 13.5 billion hectares
of total land in the world, Now the land ―available for expanded rain-fed crop
production‖ brings us to just 2 billion hectares, minus a 500 million hectares for
environmental reasons. We are down to 1.5 billion hectares of land open for crop
production, 80 percent of this available land is found in sub-Saharan Africa, and in South
America (FAO3, 2008). Half of this 80 percent can be narrowed down to seven
developing countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Angola, Democratic
Republic of Congo, and Sudan. Limiting the scope of land available for agricultural
expansion doesn't even begin to express the scarcity issues. Population growth, climate
FIGURE 3.2 Area of Land Deals 2001-11

change, and geopolitical environments
add in new factors to be considered in
association with land availability.
Recent research has led to an
estimated total of 79.9 million hectares
of land being wrapped up in these
foreign investment deals from 2001 to
2010 . Figure 3.2 displays a breakdown
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of the near 80 million hectares that have passed hands over the past 9 years. Africa
accounting for over half of these deals is of particular importance given the state of their
food security. Putting the amount of land into perspective: ―80M hectares is more than
the area of farmland of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy combined‖ (The Economist
2011). The map found in Appendix B links the land grabbed to the purchasing country.
Countries owning the land are open circles, while the solid circles represent the country
in which land is owned.
Land-use changes not only displaces local inhabitants, it often creates further food
security issues, upsets environmental balances, tend to raise bio-diversity concerns, and
pulls local resources away from current productions. Once commercial investments
sweep up the most attractive land cites, marginal lands are being left for the activities of
local farmers. ―These lands could, in turn, become subject to increased pressure,
exploitation, degradation, and conflict‖ (Haralambous 2009). There are numerous
instances in which the consequences of land grabbing have become realized.
The loss of Sheanut trees in the White Volta River basin of Ghana hurts those
dependent on this commodity for their livelihood. Used to make medicines, cook, and in
the production of soaps and cosmetics. Most importantly it serves as a source of income
for women. Gender oriented studies of development have given evidence as to the
particular importance women's income has on the welfare of a household. Women tend to
spend their incomes on more essential items for the household: food, clothing, and
education, ―a recent World Bank report confirms that societies that discriminate on the
basis of gender pay the cost of greater poverty, slower economic growth, weaker
governance, and a lower living standard of their people‖ (Chuston 2002), hardly a
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positive outcome for a developing region. Allegations ensued after a mining company
based out of London invested USD 510 million on 30,000 hectares in the Southern
District of Gaza was given land promised to 1,000 displaced families. The Government of
Mozambique gave away the land in a contract for the company to grow sugar,
complicating the issue further was the availability of water in the region.
Another example of the consequences brought on by ―land grabbing‖ comes from
Central Sierra Leone. Expecting 2,000 jobs, and protection for the bolis swamps in which
rice is grown, Makeni farmers agreed to grant a Swiss company a 50-year lease on
40,000 hectares. 3 years later, in their venture to grow biofuels for Europe only 50 new
jobs exist. Perhaps worse yet, irrigation damaged the bolis swampland. Thus we are
presented with mounting evidence that the development that does come from these
ventures brings environmental, social, and economic expenses in the short-run, and more
solidly in the long-run for local communities involved. The investments being made are
driving up the costs of food by limiting the amount of land available, disrupting local
community's livelihood, and displacing existing smallholder farms in developing nations.
New technology, higher tax revenues, better infrastructure, and more jobs,
definitely sounds like a great deal for the host country. However, these upsides are for the
most part non-existent. Labor that does open up is often filled by outsiders. Tax holiday's,
and corrupt governments lead to small if any contributions to the local public purse.
Sadly, ―it is not unusual for foreign investors to pay less tax than local smallholders‖ (The
Economist1 2011). There seems to be overwhelming evidence against land grabbing. Yet
in Madagascar we saw both sides of the investments, the bad and the good. After offering
a South Korean company half of their arable land, the approving government was
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overthrown. Years later, research found the land deals had fallen significantly, and
investment projects brought benefits to the social infrastructure. Investors built schools,
and clinics as part of the land deals. If this were the case in just some of the investments
we may have a decent argument for the proposition of land grabbing. Perhaps someday
this will be the case, for the time being evidence has found ―land grabbing‖ to be a
―combination of high levels of corruption with low levels of benefit‖ (The Economist1
2011)
Chapter 3.3 Water Availability
―We have a looming water crisis. This crisis is the response to
growing population, changing dietary habits, and competition for water
from other sectors of the economy. Lack of water for growing food will be
one of the most critical issues for us to overcome in the twenty-first
century‖
-Colin Chartres & Samyuktha Varma, 2010
Water without doubt, for obvious reasons, ranks among most important resources.
Nothing about the security of water is simple. We can operate on a rule of thumb: water
interacts with the environment. Without launching ourselves into a full scale discussion
on the ins and outs of water security, we can limit ourselves to the interactions that
strictly concern agricultural practices. Mainly: Groundwater overdrafting, and overuse
and pollution of water harming biodiversity. Overdrafting occurs on a widespread basis
as countries attempt to satisfy their growing water needs. Specifically China, India, and
the United States all participate in overdrafting. These big grain producers ―along with a
number of other countries where water tables are falling, are home to more than half the
world's people‖ (Brown 2010). The US Ogallala aquifer, the Saudi aquifer, and the deep
aquifer under the North China Plain are all fossil aquifers, thus are nonreplenishable.
More arid regions lack the option of reverting to lower-yield rain-fed crops, and could
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mean the end of agriculture, heightening the upward pressure on food prices.
Significant productivity changes stand as a result of water availability. Wells in
Beijing require a depth of 1,000 meters, over half a mile, to reach fresh water. Increased
depth of wells translates into increased costs of supply (Brown 2010). Biophysical
realities have caught up to human ambition, suddenly the apparent bliss of the impact our
agricultural practices are having on the environment is coming to a breaking point.
Aquifers across the globe cyphered, wetlands were drained, streams modified. Several
river basins have been closed in response to our disruption of natural water flows:
Colorado, Darling, Murray, yellow, Indus, Amu Darya, and others.
FIGURE 3.3 Water Availability Map

Source: analysis prepared by DAI for USAID in 2010
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As seen in figure 3.3, the areas most threatened by food security tend to be the
areas also most threatened with water security. This comes as no surprise given the links
between the two. However, it does add to the stress of those nations in solving their food
crisis concerns, when water availability is a large limiting factor. The map shows water
availability below 1,000m³/capita/year hurts economic development, and a population's
well-being. Keep in mind this indicator is not taking into account the quality or access to
water itself.
According to USAID, ―Global demand for water is doubling every 20 years, and
more than 2.8 billion people will live in either water-scarce or water-stressed regions by
2025‖ (USAID 2010). The Agricultural sector consumes over 70 percent of the world's
available water. Access to water often dictates the livelihoods of rural populations;
relocation becomes imperative when crops and incomes suffer from a loss of water. It is
then the job of a government and national infrastructure to help provide water. A lack of
access to water threatens human health, and undermines economic development (USAID
2010).
The less water available in a region, the more expensive this water is. The prices
of food reflect a region's water availability. Access to water, seen in figure 3.4 illustrates
the world picture of water access in 2010. The world's accessible renewable fresh water is
limited to an estimated 12,500km3 (Brown 2010). Again in figure 3.4 we see a similar
pattern as in 3.3, the regions facing food security issues are also the ones with limited
access to water. This taps further into the issues surrounding the previous section on land
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FIGURE 3.4 Global Access to Water (2010)

Source: USAID/ABRI/ DAI August 2010

availability. These same regions are the areas where land investments are being made by
commercialized farming entities. The increased demand for water cannot be met with
easy solutions in these regions of lower access to water. Disrupting the natural flow of
water affects hydrological conditions. The impact our agricultural practices have on the
ecosystem need to be addressed to further understand the complexities surrounding the
issue of water availability. The impacts of irrigation include: reduction of downstream
river discharge, evaporation, groundwater recharge, ground subsidence, soil salinity,
alkaline soil, and bioretention. Elaborating further would lead us to a rule of thumb: water
utilization by agricultural practices negatively impacts the ecosystem.
Water extraction methods are not cheap. Saudi Arabia ―is as water poor as it is oil
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rich‖ (Brown 2010). Using oil money, Saudi Arabia subsidized its expensive irrigated
agriculture; wheat prices 5 times the world level. Wheat harvests dropped 71 percent after
the government cut subsidies in 2005. Gaining access to water is environmentally taxing,
fiscally taxing, and culturally taxing. States with weak infrastructures and poor
governments are not likely to help their people gain access to water. Systems, in which
we are seeing exploitation on the basis of land, also tend to have similar problems
surrounding their water supplies.
The links between water and food security create a better understanding as to the
water availability issue driving food prices. Figure 3.5 demonstrates this link. The map
FIGURE 3.5 Water and Food Security (2010)

Source: USAID 2010 [Millennium Development Goals Indicators/UNEP]
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shows two things: the percentage withdrawn of total renewable supplies (country colors),
and the utilization of these withdrawals in the pie charts. Pie chart sizes are proportional
to the continent's total renewable supplies. North America, Europe and Eurasia use a
larger portion of their renewable water for industrial purposes than they do agriculture.
Explanations could mean these countries have implementing water management practices
in their agricultural sector that result in higher water efficiency. However, since the
nonrenewable water supplies are not represented, such conclusions are simply
speculative.
Access to water for agriculture and other household needs often results in more
disastrous outcomes than simply higher supply costs. Water wars are perhaps a testament
to the base survival instincts that govern human actions. Violence is another issue brought
on by a lack of access to water. Forget about wars over black gold, thirsty humans will be
fighting over blue gold. Egypt has seen skirmishes for centuries over the Nile. In 1967
Israel's war against the Arab Armies was for water, according to prime minister at the
time, Ariel Sharon (Arsenault 2011). Water Conflict hotspots pop up generally in the
same areas we have seen in our previous graphs. Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, Egypt, Kenya,
India, Pakistan, China, and Ethiopia, are just some of the areas facing physical conflicts
over water resources (Arsenault 2011). Understandable so given the stress of lower
access to low amounts of available water is likely to spark conflicts. Water resources are
often used as territory lines, ―263 river basins (home to 40% of the world‘s population)
are shared by two or more countries‖ (USAID 2010). When water is scarce people fight
for their right to it, or relocate. Water availability and access dictates human behavior.
The availability and access of water contributes to food prices. Both indirectly via
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lowering of yields, and directly as an input cost where extraction methods are concerned.
Land availability and water availability both tie into the productivity of agriculture. If the
recent food prices are seeing less available land for agriculture, as well as less water
availability, then the two situations come into play when crop yields are analyzed. We
have established agricultural land is becoming more scarce, and water is also becoming
more scarce, both contributing to higher food prices.
Chapter 3.4 Climate Change
Previous discussion began building the issue from the ground up, quite literally,
impacts of recent climate change already resulted in reductions of food supply. At the risk
of being redundant, the droughts and excessive floods cited earlier attest to the poor
harvests brought about by climate change. Rising temperatures threaten crop
susceptibility to viruses and pests, while simultaneously strengthening these threats.
China and India stand concerned over the rapid melting of glaciers that feed into key
rivers: Yellow, Yangtze, and Ganges; which they draw heavily on for wheat and rice
production. Put together China and India account for over half the world's wheat and rice
production, making this a global concern. In our attempt to produce cheap food we are
exploiting scarce resources and destroying the environment (Ikred 2008).
Polluting streams and groundwater with run-offs from fertilizers and pesticides,
farms are currently not ecologically sustainable. Touching briefly on the industrialization
of agriculture, recent technological ―advances‖, ―may well have done more damage to the
ecologic and social resource base of rural areas than any societal benefit they may have
created in terms of more efficient food production‖ (Ikred 2008). Saving the full onset of
the impact changes in agriculture for a later chapter, it is important to realize here that the
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technology may not be aligning society's best interests with food production practices.
The natural environment is being impacted by our actions, agriculture among the most
disruptive of human activities affecting the globe today. Mentioned earlier the effects of
irrigation alone are enough to alarm even the most audacious. In his report for the
International Policy Institute, ―Climate Change: Impact on agriculture and Costs of
Adaptation‖, Gerald Nelson concludes ―agriculture and human well-being will be
negatively affected by climate change‖ (Nelson 2008).
Climate and agriculture are interactive. Adaptations occur in response to climate
changes, these adaptations affect the climate, relating the two dynamically. To be more
specific, agriculture interacts with the environment in 4 ways: greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions (soil management and livestock), altering atmospheric CO2 levels, biomass
displacement of fossil fuels, and heat absorption of Earth's surface. Agriculture GHG
emissions make up roughly 7 percent of U.S. GHG emissions. Of that 7 percent, nearly
half comes from soil management, 30 percent from eccentric fermentation (digestive
process in animals that produces methane), 12 percent from manure management, and a
final 14 percent is attributed to energy use (Climate Techbook 2011). Land-use practices
and changes fluctuate the amount of Carbon stored in soil and plants. Fluctuations are
either a release or an uptake of carbon. On average, ―forests and wetlands generally store
more carbon than grasslands, which in turn tend to store more carbon than cropland‖,
hence the need to manage land usage.
According to the Climate Techbook, ―agricultural lands in the United States act as
a small carbon sink, storing more carbon than they release. Putting this into perspective,
forests in the U.S. store about 20 times more carbon than the entire U.S. agricultural

30
sector (Climate Techbook 2011). Without land use management techniques the release of
carbon from agricultural practices, naturally, is expected to be much higher. Agriculture
has the potential to reduce GHG emissions through its ability to substitute fossil fuels
with biomass. Here we will not go much further into details, as you can imagine an entire
section will no doubt be devoted to biofuels. Yet this work would be remiss if we did not
mention the potential of reduction in emissions has much more to consider than the
outright use of biofuels versus fossil fuels. There are climate impacts on the production
end of bioenergy. In the section dedicated to biofuels we will cover the life-cycle of
emissions resulting from biomass: ―land management practices, land use change,
conversion processes and associated energy use, and transportation‖ (Climate Techbook
2011). As end users of transportation and energy, the agricultural sector commits further
impacts on climate change.
Change to the climate system by agriculture results in a local warming effect.
Solar energy reflected by the surface of the Earth increases with lighter surfaces, such as
snow, and ice. These are said to have a high albedo, or a larger fraction of reflected solar
energy. Now surfaces with a low albedo, dark surfaces, absorb a larger fraction of solar
energy. Soils and darker vegetation have a low albedo, they absorb more solar energy and
thus release more heat. More heat into the atmosphere creates this local warming effect,
which in turn affects the entire global climate system as a hole. ―Agricultural land, which
includes cropland, managed grassland, and permanent crops, occupies about 40-50
percent of the world‘s total land surface‖ (Climate Techbook 2011). According to
Synthesis Report from the Climate Change Congress - University of Copenhagen
(Richardson et al., 2009):
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―Recent observations show that societies and ecosystems are highly
vulnerable to even modest levels of climate change, with poor nations and
communities, ecosystem services and biodiversity particularly at risk.
Temperature rises above 2°C will be difficult for contemporary societies
to cope with and are likely to cause major societal and environmental
disruptions through the rest of the century and beyond.‖
We are locked into this man versus nature mentality, fighting off the wild beasts,
willing the land and water to cooperate with our every whim. Settling in deserts and flood
lands, using dams and dykes, we disrupted natural flows of water. Now the sediment once
found to replenish topsoil for fertile farmlands after periodic flooding now rests in lakes
and reservoirs. Wiping out species as we fight more battles against nature, cultivating
lands, and urbanizing where we please, humans manipulate the environment. Curing
diseases and killing of pests only to create super germs, more resilient diseases.
Abandoning diversity, thanks to modern chemical pesticides, yet ―we still lose the same
percentage of crops to pests as we did in earlier times‖ (Ikred 2008). Are we winning yet?
Let's consider the impact some of our actions in regards to agriculture have had on
climate throughout the past. Granted we are being unimaginably brief here considering
the scope spans across time, globally, and is often undocumented. Regardless, we need to
peek into the past to know the effects. Starting close to home; The U.S. drained a
significant proportion of wetlands in its Midwest regions. The disruption of natural flows
of water resulted in serious complications just recently, ―The recent disastrous floods in
the U.S. Midwest would have been far less damaging if wetlands in the region hadn't
been drained decades ago‖ (Leahy 2008). Wetlands serve several ecological purposes:
capture carbon and methane, home to biodiversity, aid in water sanitation, and as
mentioned crucial for flood control. Wetlands all around the globe have been, and are
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being drained for agricultural purposes. This drainage Releases large amounts of carbon
and methane, 21 times more potent than CO2, into the atmosphere. Taking this to a global
level:
―Some 60 percent of wetlands worldwide - and up to 90 percent
in Europe - have been destroyed in the past 100 years, principally due to
drainage for agriculture but also through pollution, dams, canals,
groundwater pumping, urban development and peat extraction‖ (Leahy
2008).
As if draining wetlands is not enough of an issue, deforestation has taken its toll
on our climate. Rainforests, ―the lungs of the world‖, are being destroyed at alarming
rates all across the globe. The effects are: displacement of indigenous people, loss of
Oxygen source, silting rivers, exacerbating floods, and soil erosion. In Sao Paulo, Brazil,
all but 3 percent of forests were destroyed. Brazil's Cerrado has lost over 60 million
hectares to soybean crops and grazing pastures. Only, Brazil's large rapidly growing
population is not the real reason for these encroachments. Slashing and burning of the
forests, planting crops then moving on once the soil has been exhausted, is not a necessity
to feed the Brazilian population. There are larger factors at play here. Soy bean exports
have become a large business in Brazil. Large mechanized soybean growers are the real
culprits, encroaching on the forest's frontiers. Buying up small farms, to the extent that
the largest farm units, ―comprise 1.6 percent of all farms, but 53.2 percent of all
agricultural land‖ (Lappe 1998).
In Central America tropical rainforests are meeting the same fate, being removed
entirely for cattle ranching and agriculture or home to logging corporations. Here we
begin to see a theme. Export agriculture displacing smallholder farms, searching for work
in the export industry that displaced them. Periods of booms and busts dictate worker
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employment, some are forced to migrate. They move further into the forests, clearing
away new land for cultivation, since the land available for cultivation is owned by a few
rich patrons. Behind them are the cattle ranchers, looking for more grazing lands.
Meanwhile demand for the exports is higher than ever, international financial institutions
and governments alike cannot get enough, bananas, soybeans, recently wheat, and
whatever the cash crop of the year is. When the smoke from the forest fires clear, humans
are left with lands that are further susceptible to natural disasters. Actions impacting our
climate, more frequent weather volatility and extremes are expected, furthering inequality
and development concerns for already hurting poor regions of the world. Now on top of
that, add in the result these recent supply shocks have had on food prices. The picture
begins to get gloomy. At the risk of being a ―chicken little‖, someone had to scream out,
―the sky is falling!‖
Perhaps too little to late, but humans have began to realize that we are this nature
we are fighting, and scarcity has been impacting our lives in a larger and larger degree,
daily. It is easy to get caught up in the actions of harvesting, mining, and further
exploiting nature to feed this human consumption. We are already wrapped up in it: lower
supply not meeting demand, the premise of this food crisis. Productivity the fixation of
our value oriented mindsets. Sustainable agriculture is a relatively new response to the
scarcities at hand. It comes with the harmonious balance of three tiers, ―ecologically
sound, economically viable, and socially responsible‖ (Ikred 2008). Entertaining the
realistic characteristics of such a harmony will occur in a later chapter. For now we
should refocus on the impact climate change has as a price driver for world foods.
Paul Krugman addressed the price driver of climate change in an article he wrote
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for the times in February of this year, ―these severe weather events are exactly the kind of
thing we'd expect to see as rising concentrations of greenhouse gases change our climate
– which means that the current food price surge may be just the beginning‖ (Krugman
2011). He seems to attribute a large enough portion of recent price spikes to climate
change, since he suggest it would mean the surges in prices being, ―just the beginning‖.
One could say climate change presents a challenge to future agricultural practices. It does
mean that there could be a higher variability in the weather pattern, and consequently
more frequent adverse events lowering stocks, yields, and productions. Adapting to this
variability then becomes the determiner of the price associated. ―Neither climate change
nor short-term climate variability and associated adaptation are new phenomena in
agriculture (Schmidhube 2007).
Climate events are as much apart as our future as they are the shaping of it. New
technologies, population growth, and economic expansion all as much a product of
climate change as they are caveats. Adaptation to anthropogenic climate tends to dictate
the direction socioeconomic development heads. Lines blur in attempts to distinguish
between the two. Developing countries clearly hold a deficiency as far adaptation to
current climate is concerned. Poor countries are more vulnerable to the climate; perhaps it
is better to specify poor people. Poor people in general, measured in terms of a specific
country are the ones who are most vulnerable, it is common sense. Can't afford to plant
seeds that are more resistant to environmental factors, farmers are more vulnerable to the
environment. Thus we are not surprised to find, ―'there is evidence that higher measures
of development indicators like per capita income, literacy and institutional capacity are
associated with lower vulnerability to climate events‖ (Noy, 2009; Bowen et al., 2009).
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This does suggest, as one would expect, adapting to climate change comes with
associated costs. Measures to adapt include: enhancing water use efficiency, changing
regulations on buildings, air conditioning, constructing sea walls, altering farming
practices, and requiring varied crops. Actors taking this measures can be both private and
public, investments made towards improving infrastructures, technology, policies, and
ultimately human behaviors. Trade-offs to these adaptations must be assessed under the
appropriate context. The nature of these estimates results in critical assumptions being
made to form a baseline of costs. The exposure of assets to climate change and the
interactions following is highly sensitive in terms of percentages, since we are dealing
with a large magnitude of baseline costs. A shift in estimates of 1 or 2 percent translates
into a rather large change in the outlay costs of adaptation. Table 3.1 outlays some of the
projected costs for Developing countries to adapt to climate changes. Four different
TABLE 3.1: Estimates of adaptation costs in developing countries, for 2010-2015

groups have taken up the empirical work here; note these estimates are linked to each
other and may not be entirely independent in terms of methods used.
As you can see the estimated costs are rather daunting, and not surprisingly very
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wide ranged. Current quantification as to the costs of climate change on food security are
highly limited, ―the existing global assessments of climate change and food security have
only been able to focus on the impacts on food availability and access to food, without
quantification of the likely important climate change effects on food safety and
vulnerability‖ (Schmidhube 2007). Yet the simulations and models have led us on some
paths. A need to address current climate change conditions in agricultural practices has
influenced us to analyze the costs and procedures associated.
Market and regulatory mechanisms are to be used in efforts of encouraging the
public sector to take on the bulk of the adaption process. By the use of policy
instruments, government should encourage self-interested moves toward effective and
efficient adaption. Facilitating autonomous adaption requires the public sector to engage
the public sector, instruments available include: ―insurance schemes, price
signals/markets, financing schemes via Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), regulatory
incentives, and research and development incentives‖ (Agrawala 2008). Like the ones in
figure 3.1, several studies have made their projections into the future and estimated what
adaptations to climate change would cost, even further the residual damages that are
inevitable. We have won battle after battle against nature. The irony, it's killing us. Our
egos are at it again if we think we are capable of overcoming climate change by
conquering nature; further pushes to attempt to control the changes set into motion may
cause us even more harm on the long run.
At present we do not have the technological capabilities to battle all of the
symptoms climate change will cause, let alone the symptoms we are facing at current.
Schematics point to avoiding the first percentages of damage to be relatively cheap and
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hold increasing marginal costs after that. Making avoiding the last little bits of damage
perhaps more cost intensive than society is willing to pay. Thus we may not be willing to
aim for a complete coverage of presumed damages to climate change in the future;
instead we will try to mitigate the effects, or try to eliminate the effects that cause harm to
human welfare. Presumably some climate effects will be cheaper to avoid than to bare.
Unfortunately, we do have budget constraints, becoming more evident with the onset of
global financial instability. Not to mention a feasibility issue, we may have the know-how
necessary to combat adaptation on the intellectual front, but the tools and implementing
cause further complications.
Either way the idealistic abstraction associated with mitigating climate change is
morphing into a collective combative forethought; sustainability is working its way into
the system. As a species, we don't have any other choice. Finite resources dictate
adaptations be made, costs associated are heavy no matter which side of the fence we fall.
Climate change is set to cause further disruptions in food supply, ―crop Yields will
decline, production will be affected, crop and meat prices will increase, consumption of
cereals will fall, leading to reduced calorie intake, and child malnutrition will increase‖
(Nelson 2000). Adaptation requires further investments into agriculture, developing
methods and strategies for increasing food production under a sustainable agricultural
system takes incentives, fiscal backing. Debate it whichever way you'd like, the costs of
adapting or not adapting to climate change will have an effect on food prices. As we have
seen, climate change is already influencing food prices.
Chapter 3.5 Low Productivity
Increases in price are supposed to provide incentives for increases in supply.
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However, the decrease in supply being a main price driver in recent price spikes tends to
limit the ability of producers to respond to price hikes as theory dictates. Agricultural
advancements have kept prices on the decline for quite some time. Over the past decade
the Agricultural Industry has not been able to change enough structurally to compensate
for the increased demand. A concept we will visit quite extensively in the chapters to
come. In reference to production, the price increases over the past two decades are not
explained by overall world production numbers, but are rather a collection of the actions
taken to maintain and in some cases increase crop production under the current world
conditions.
Using the World Agricultural Report put out by the USDA Foreign Agriculture
Service on October 12th, 2011, the Area, yields, and productions of major world crops
will give a better understanding of what's happening on the supply end of world food
markets. Under the background of scarce resources, adverse weather, and climate
changes, we will interpret the quantitative results of recent food production. Figures
represent the production figures released in the USDA's October 12th crop report. As of
October 12th 2011, Wheat and barley are seeing drops in area yields, and consequently
production. Corn yields are down 2.3% from last year. Productivity is lower, and stocks
are lower, combined the pressure of decreased supplies has taken its toll on world crop
prices.
Upon discovering figure 3.6, the global conditions discussed start to link
themselves to the outcomes of world production. Wheat the victim of droughts over the
past year reflects this with a loss in production of 5.3%. Main regions bringing about the
production loss are Afghanistan, Iran, Argentina, and the U.S. Barley dropped 17.6% over
the past year. Germany, Iran, the U.S., France, Austria, and Australia round off the top
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percentage losses. Corn Yields dropped by 2.3%, however cultivated land increases made
for a minimal increase in production.

Seeing the year differences in world production only makes one more curious as
to the changes across the board from spike to spike of increased food prices. During the
first recent food price spike, 2006/07-2007/08, wheat production dropped over 25% in
Argentina, Afghanistan, and the Kazakhstan Republic. With the worst of these
Afghanistan, suffering a 55% drop in wheat production from 2006/07 to 2007/08. What
changes are occurring from price spike to price spike? Figure 3.7 satisfies this curiosity.
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Production is up along with area and yields for all but one of the commodities observed,
barley. Although coming in with a strong yield increase across the period, barley's
production was down 6.9%, which is perhaps explained by the lower area. Soybean Area
increased a rather large amount, something we should keep in mind for later discussions
involving Soybean demand. Staying focused on production, it seems surprising that we
are not seeing lower yields and even lower overall productions in the commodities
observed. This tells us that from spike to spike we saw increases in production, making
the 2011 price spike, not about low productivity.
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Recent price increases, do not seem to be explained away by lower yields or lower
productions of commodities. Yet these are world figures. The trade policies along with
specific production components of a specific country could be cause for additional weight
on production in the food price increases seen for that country. So Supply in physical
terms is not contracting in respect to previous supplies, that is for most of the
commodities. Wheat and Barley are in fact the exceptions, their supplies are contracting
with respect to previous year supplies, making production components a larger factor in
price increases, than they may be for other commodities.
Intensive production, the pressure to meet growing demands has lead agriculture
to seek profit maximizing measures which are harmful to the environment. It's extremely
difficult to draw a line and pinpoint when agriculture became more about making profits
than feeding people. Technology has evolved over time, advanced. Skills, tools, and
knowledge all building, leading humanity on a path. The direction of this path has led to
many shortfalls. Agriculture is no different; advancements in agricultural technology do
not translate into progress. Changes brought about in the name of increasing yields,
productivity, and quality of agricultural goods, may not have been the best direction.
Commercial farming: the answer to our production shortfalls, or the culprit to our hunger
crisis? Perhaps it's both, but analyzing food price increases requires substantial attention
be paid to agricultural technology.
Production itself holds several key driving factors. Looking at production as a
whole and quantifying end figures doesn't capture the whole story. Farmer's need to think
about the many variable factors concerned with production: seed availability and quality,
planting times, costs; fertilizer use, availability and cost; pests, types, challenges, and
control; fungal diseases, and seed dressing, Weeds, herbicides, and burning, weather,
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floods, frosts, landslides, hail, and any climate shift, Civil disturbances, wars, raiding, and
theft; population disturbances, settlements, migration, and political pressures; market
control measures, taxes, restriction on trade, environmental regulations, and government
incentives; Machinery, mechanical power, spare parts access, and fuel availability; access
to credit and costs associated. As if this was not enough of a headache the fixed factors
perhaps play larger roles: access to land, labor availability, and water availability. Society
demands a lot of the agricultural industry. We want more than just to have food to eat.
The developed world has been conditioned. We roam the supermarket shelves and into
the produce section, searching for the glossiest apple, or the perfect pare. For most,
without little more than a second of inspection, throwing in the least blemished fruit or
vegetable. Not realizing how unnatural our prize picked plums actually are.
For which we have pesticides to thank. A hotspot for debate over agricultural
practices, pesticides have become like most input practices a necessary evil in the effort
to compete. ―Worldwide, pesticides now add 25.5 billion to farmers' costs annually, while
the human health toll is even more staggering‖ (Lappe 1998). In 1998, estimates
suggested 25 million people were infected with pesticide poisoning each year, and the
pesticides seen in the third world are the worst of the worst. Chemicals banned for use in
the U.S. are exported from the U.S. Where do they end up? You guessed it, Farms in the
developing world, where safety of these chemicals is of little or no concern to farm
owners. ―In the Philippines, the Ivory Coast, and Central America, we found pesticides
being indiscriminately sprayed from airplanes, and from canisters strapped to the back of
unprotected workers‖ (Lappe 1998), all those chemicals out into the environment, into
water supplies. In the U.S. the EPA found 10.4 percent of community water wells are
contaminates with a pesticide. The kicker, all this pesticide use has been in vain, ―Despite
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a tenfold increase in the amounts and toxicity of pesticides since their commercial
introduction in the late 1940s, crop losses to insects have nearly doubled‖ (Lappe 1998),
all to fend off and additional estimated 1 or 2 percent of crop losses that would occur sans
pesticides. Their effectiveness is not impressive, ―0.1 percent of the pesticides applied to
crops actually reaches targeted pests‖ (Lappe 1998).
One case study showed increasing pesticide usage, did not increase yields. In
Pakistan we are seeing relatively low yields, and ―in Pakistan the use of chemicals and
fertilizer nutrients are increasing and some of the chemicals being used are banned in
other countries‖ (2003). Then we read another case study in 2010, outlining that pesticide
use is economically feasible and it did increase production. However, this case study does
specify, ―pesticide use definitely helps in improving the crop productivity and quality if
right type of pesticide is used at right time with right dose‖ (Khan 2010). Perhaps it's like
everything else, moderation maximizes returns. Go too far one way or the other on the
pesticide spectrum and you're done for. Thus current literature encourages Integrated Pest
Management (IPM), using pesticides wisely. Either way modern agriculture has created a
pesticide treadmill. Once you hop on, you have to start running, else you'll fall off. Yet
again, ―we still lose about the same percentage of our crops as we did in earlier times‖
(Ikerd 2008).
Chapter 3.6 Biotechnology
Using modern chemicals we can kill most insects, diseases, parasites, and weeds.
Moving us into the abandonment of diversified family farms to realize lower food prices
associated with the industrialization of agriculture. We have adopted a mechanistic
worldview, and are treating science as a religion. Science has shifted from being about
understanding to manipulating, reaching toward an end goal of power rather than of
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wisdom. Agriculture has been infected by the movement into systematic production.
Machines, selective breeding, commercial fertilizers, irrigation, processing, storage, and
transportation all create an assembly line turning farms into factories. These factories
become part of the food supply chain, an ever tightening market. Fooled into the illusion
of competition and choice by the myriad of names, the food system has consolidated.
Appendix C displays a mapping of the Seed Industry, which consolidates down to
―the big Six‖: ―Monsanto, DuPont, Syngenta, Bayer, Dow, and BASF collectively own or
partially-own hundreds of formerly-independent seed companies -- and Monsanto, of
course, dominates them all‖ (Huff 2011). With the first 5 of these companies being
chemical or pharmaceutical companies, the oligarchy is shaping itself into a monopoly,
with the power to dictate farmer actions.
In the past, thousands varieties of rice were grown, over 5,000 kinds of potatoes
were cultivated worldwide; in the 19th century more than 7,000 varieties of apples were
grown in the U.S. Along came the 20th century, Nitrogen bombs modified into nitrogen
fertilizers, and nerve gas modified into insecticides. Agriculture technology made yields
increase and brought more food to market at cheaper prices. Increases in production did
follow. Monoculture creates an ecological vacuum; diseases could wipe out entire crops.
One example: the potato famine in Ireland killing 1 million. Today only 4 varieties of
potatoes are widely grown, 90% of the vegetables grown at the beginning of the 20th
century are now extinct. This lack of biodiversity makes crops more vulnerable to
diseases and thus farming more dependent on the technologies of pesticides, fertilizers,
and genetically modified plants.
At the peak of these, Monsanto's round up, praised for its ability to kill weeds.
Biotechnology gave way to the ―green revolution‖ becoming the ―gene revolution‖.
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Monsanto came out with a roundup ready seed, a genetically modified soybean crop.
Now the same company selling you the seed is selling you a pesticide that kills
everything except the crop, industrializing food at the cellular level. Patents were allowed
in the 1930s for genetically modified plants. The genetically engineered corn Monsanto
makes is classified and an insecticide itself, a corn bore will die if it eats any part of the
plant (Future of Food 2007).
Starting in 1978 with a genetically engineered microbe that ate oil, life was
allowed to be patented; animals, human genes, even body parts all became patented.
―Companies now have the power to own, and control a species of the Earth‖ (Future of
Food 2007). These corporations have gone so far as to going into the seed banks and
patenting all the seeds that have yet to be patented. Monsanto is said to have over 11,000
seed patents. Transgenic research comes with risks. Species resist foreign DNA,
overcoming this resistances requires cell invasions. The known ways to do this is through
bacteria and viruses. Using E. coli bacteria, combining roundup resistant bacteria, and
soil bacteria that causes tumors in plants, they inject their genetic mutations into the
plant's nucleus. The other two methods available are: streams of electricity to infiltrate
cell walls, and a gene gun that blasts particles of gold coated with the engineered DNA.
All methods require a promoter gene to turn on desired characteristics. This gene is
drawn from a virus.
Moving genetic material that doesn't normally move requires these risky invasion
purposes. Engineers also put in antibiotic marker genes, the catalysts for the concern over
these genetically modified plants (GMs or GMOs). The medical community is concerned
over the implications this has for the effectiveness of antibiotics. Genes function in
complex networks, and are unpredictable. Once these GM plants get out, they cannot be
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controlled, they will reproduce. The first GM to hit the market, flavor savored tomatoes,
was found to cause lesions in the stomachs of rats. Genetically modified foods are apart
of the every day diet, yet in the U.S. They are not required to label their products as
genetically modified. The USDA did not require a single environmental assessment.
Falling into the GRAS category, government does not require testing or labeling of
GMOs (Genetically Modified Organisms).
The same multinational corporations, who told us pesticides such as DDT were
safe, are now telling us their new products are safe. Protests for labeling were defeated by
Monsanto's 4.6 million dollar campaign to prevent the labeling act from passing.
Research shows 80-90 percent of Americans want GMOs labeled, except the act to do so
is still waiting, since 1999, to be voted on. 75 percent of European public did not want
genetically engineered food, they require labeling. There is a reason Corporations fought
against it, no traceability without labeling thus less accountability. Health effects go
undocumented in relation to the genetic modified food, eliminating the links between the
health effects and GMOs. At this point it's become another case of implementing
technology without an understanding of the full effects of their impacts (Future of Food
2007).
The biotech industry claimed they were safe and increased yields. Monsanto,
―Roundup ready soybeans‖, genetically modified seeds, designed to be sprayed by
Monsanto's famous Round Up. These new seeds were the answer, pest resistant, strong
safe, marketing ran away with themselves on the impressive new seeds of the future.
Surprisingly, they didn't look at routine stresses. Researchers found decreases in size of
the root system, up to 25 percent in drought conditions (Future of Food 2007). They also
had not tested the effects of spraying roundup on the roundup ready soybean plant's
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ability to affix nitrogen. Yet despite a lack of complete understanding of the
biotechnology, already released out into the environment, the field has little if any
regulation in the U.S.
Whatever moral implications you would like to attach to the industry, the market
power and control they have is impressive. Monsanto's CEO Hugh Grant recognizes,
―satisfying the demand curve is a great business opportunity‖ (Urquhart 2008). Rushing
to develop drought resistant transgenetic crops, Monsanto prepares for the mass adoption
of GM technology. Is biotechnology the answer to increasing the food supply? Where do
food prices come into play?
Are these monoculture-opolies producing more food? Some say no, ―biodiverse
systems actually produce more food‖ (Shiva 2008). Others say, ―the key to increasing
yields is to ensure that even the poorest farmers have access to improved seed varieties,
chemical fertilizers, organic matter to replenish soil nutrients, and where possible, smallscale irrigation methods, such as a pump to lift water from a nearby well‖ (Sachs 2008).
This has been the case since the 1960s, agricultural technology has resulted in lower food
prices across time, and the reason: increased efficiencies in production.
Nobel Prize winning agronomist Norman Borlaug insists that the genetically
modified foods are the answer to world starvation. Sustainable farming is a romanticized
view, and molecular biotechnology is the only way for third world farmers to increase
their yields (Borlaug 2004). He views biotechnology under the light of offering higher
yields, more resistant crops, requiring less land, and fewer chemicals. Utilizing less
scarce resources, but allowing the same output in a more efficient manner. ―No negative
health or environmental effects have been observed‖ (Borlaug 2004). He further places
limitations on our abilities to live sustainably, touting ―the world cannot feed all its 6.9

48
billion people from organic farms or power all of its cities and industries by wind and
solar power‖ (Borlaug 2004). Aligning with Borlaug, Jeffery Sachs sees technology as
the key to increasing yields. ―Traditional farming uses few inputs and gets poor yields‖
(Sachs 2008).
The Union of Concerned scientists tell us a different side, Molecular biologist
Mellon brought the realistic side of biotechnology to light:
― 'Let's be clear here: there are no crops on the market today genetically
engineered to directly maximize yields' ...'there are no crops on the market
engineered to resist drought. And there are no crops on the market to reduce
fertilizer use. Not one'‖ (Union of Concerned Scientists 2008).
Marketing ploys and all the hyping is not enough to convince these scientists that
genetically engineered crops can produce enough food to feed the world. These increased
yields and drought tolerant plants are a figment of the Biotech companies' dreams. In
reality the genetically engineered crops are resistant to certain pests, and can withstand
glyphosate, your weed killing miracle in the Round Up formula.
Perhaps we are not at odds here. Perceptions and interpretations have led to
similar paths, in which we are forced to decipher the intentions of semantics. It seems
genetic engineering has the potential to increase yields, yet the environmental and health
hazards have not been fully realized before mass implementation of the technology has
taken place. The technology available currently, that does not involve genetically
engineered crops has the results the world is looking for, Mellon explains, ―' Traditional
plant breeding, crop rotation and marker-assisted breeding...and ecological farming
systems that use such methods as crop rotation and cover crops, have a long history of
boosting food crop yields'‖ (Union of Concerned Scientists 2008). He does recognize the
future possibilities of GE crops playing a larger role in food production, but currently the
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realistic side shows the push of GE crops to be more of a market takeover by the biotech
industry.
The profit driven corporate agendas are clouding this potential for the technology
to make a difference in the developing world. Biodiversity is not mutually exclusive to
genetic engineering. The mechanized viewpoint of agriculture is causing destructive
patterns to emerge. Furthermore current agricultural practices are not sustainable.
Biotechnology may very well be the answers to food production needs; however the
strategies and ethics associated with it today are amounting to more market failures,
further development concerns, and even greater corporate control. The sales pitches are
overshadowing our best tools to address food security, ―in paces like Africa, fertilizer,
better grain storage, and improved roads would be much better and more cost effective
options than expensive patented biotechnology seeds that so far offer so little'‖ (Union of
Concerned Scientists 2008)
It is not pertinent to discuss the production changes, and even supply as a whole
without determining their growth and contraction in relation to demand. Thus we need to
draw on the available information for consumption over the past decade in order to draw
more thorough conclusions on the status of world production, and ultimately the velocity
in which supply factors are driving current food prices.
Chapter 4: Demand Shocks
The demand side of the food crisis houses more of the controversies than the
supply side. It is not as easy to argue the role of supply in driving up prices, but the very
nature of demand leaves a fair amount of open room for criticism and debate to fester and
coddle itself. Given the limitations and scope of this paper, only two aspects of demand
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will be discussed, granted at length, but still only two aspects. These two major aspects of
demand are biofuels, and income changes.
Chapter 4.1: Biofuels
Receiving much of the rhetoric these days, biofuels migrated their way into a
social taboo. A topic often avoided at dinner tables, so as to keep the peace. Almost
everyone is familiar with the basic premise of the debate, ―food versus fuel‖. Both sides
are perfectly adequate at framing their analysis. The same world, same data, and same
stimuli, all lead to two opposing responses. How can it be? We'll show you.
Table 4.1 will allow us to demonstrate the power of framing. Furthermore, to
recognize the context data is not only estimated in, but interpreted in. The table shows
some simple measures from the yearly cereal supply and use data put out by the USDA.
Often time these data sets become the soul premise for arguments for or against biofuels.
The story seems more impressive when spun using 2007/2008 figures, however the
recent estimates will work just fine in our efforts to determine the power of perception.
Beginning the story with a pro biofuels position, the world used 2.2 billion metric
tons of cereals in 2010/2011. Of which, over 2.1 billion tons were used to feed the
livestock, poultry, and people of the world. Corn used by ethanol plants in the U.S.
amounted to less than 6 percent of total world cereal use. These estimates don't take into
account the byproducts of the ethanol process. Thus the numbers are overstating the
amount of grains used for food. Livestock feed and vegetable oil come from the ethanol
process, and go on to food and feed markets. If this modest amount of world cereal use is
to blame for the price hikes in food, it does not make sense to have a higher availability
and increased use of cereals worldwide. Table 4.1 shows the world use for all cereals
increased by 24 million metric tons. Showing us the world is capable of producing both
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food and fuel. Note that the increase in corn consumption was over 9 million metric tons
TABLE 4.1 World Cereal Consumption 2009/10 - 2010/11
World Consumption
Corn
Wheat
Milled Rice
Other Cereals
All Cereals
U.S. Corn Consumptions
Corn Used in U.S. Ethanol
plants
World Cereal use except
corn used in U.S. Ethanol
plants
Corn Used in U.S. Ethanol
plants as a share of world
cereal use

842.41
642
443
299
2227
331

Absolute
Change
20
23
10
-28
24
-0.78

Percentage
change
2.40%
3.65%
2.25%
-8.53%
1.10%
-0.24%

115

126

10.72

9.34%

2088

2102

13.48

0.65%

5.21%

5.63%

2009/2010

2010/2011

822.7
620
434
327
2203
332

Source: Author Calculations based on USDA PSD Online Data set and World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, Oct. 2011

greater than the increase in corn ethanol use, making the increase in demand for reasons
aside from biofuels.
Now for the opposing side, table 4.1 suggests the demand for ethanol was a
critical driver in cereal price increases between 2009/2010 and 2010/2011. World cereal
consumption increased by 24 million metric tons. Despite a large drop in other cereals,
corn consumption was up 20 million metric tons. U.S. Ethanol plant consumption, 11
million metric tons, accounts for over half of the world's increase in corn consumption.
Population growth from 2009 to 2010 matched the increase in total cereal consumption.
Per capita cereal consumption stayed nearly unchanged from 2009/2010 to 2010/2011.
Making the increase in U.S. Corn use for ethanol of 11 million metric tons, almost half
the increase of total world cereals, rather alarming. Corn ending stocks in the U.S.
dropped 34 percent. The increase in ethanol use of cereals is stressing the balance
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between supply and demand. Increases in cereal prices, and food prices in general are
being impacted by this stress ethanol demand has caused.
Framing, two sides same data table, manipulation of perception tow very different
directions. The complexity of the issue alone is cause for caution when arguing sides and
deciphering the truth. However, throw in these framing strategies and you have yourself a
game of collecting and interpreting information to get the conclusions desired. This game
has no rules, and the playing field stretches from production capabilities, to
environmental benefits and costs. So then, how much of the food price increases can we
attribute to biofuel production?
Looking at changes in consumption, in a table that merely shows amounts
consumed and then U.S. ethanol use of corn, gives us a rather limited snapshot of the
biofuel industry. Consumption and demand lead us to make rather meaningless
conclusions when the costs are not discussed. However, there are broad conclusions
which remain solid, ―the rapid increase in biofuel production between 2005 to the middle
of 2008 increased the total world demand for grain, sugar and vegetable oil‖ (Westhoff
2010). This demand shift helped put upward pressure on world food prices, yet we know
there were other factors at play.
Higher expected prices for corn, with the biofuel demand spiking translated into
more acres of corn being planted. Figure 4.1 shows that in 2007/08 59 percent of the total
acres for corn and soybeans went to plant corn. Past farming patterns kept land shares
relatively even, since farmers would rotate between the two crops often. However, the
biofuel industry created incentives to shift acres over to corn. Growth in the ethanol
industry leveled off around this same time. Prices across the board fell in the later half of
2008.
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FIGURE 4.1: U.S. Area Planted For Corn and Soybean Last Decade
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Biofuel production also increases the demand for vegetable oils and animal fats.
With soybean oil in a higher demand, crushers can afford to pay more for raw beans,
resulting in higher soybean prices. Indirectly poultry, meat, and milk prices are affected
by biofuel production. ―Most of the world's corn is fed to livestock and poultry‖
(Westhoff 2010). Increases in ethanol production causing higher corn prices raise
production prices for turkey, pork, beef, chicken, eggs, and even milk. Higher production
costs may result in lower production, making prices higher. According to their demands
of corn feed, and soybean meal, livestock industry has limited leeway in adjusting to
price changes. Biology dictates the time at which producers can respond to price changes
for feeds. Beef and pork industries remain fairly inelastic in the short-run to higher feed
prices. Distiller grains from biofuel production allows for some of this inelasticity to be
alleviated. Yet, the byproducts do not hold as many calories; most calories in the corn get
turned into ethanol. The net effect is a decrease in feed availability, but this does not
necessarily mean this is the case with increases in biofuel production.
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The scenario changes slightly with the production of biodiesel from soybean oil.
Increased demand for soybean oil means higher soybean prices, resulting in increased
production of soybeans and soybean meal, and lowering the costs of production for
livestock industries. Yet, we are forgetting the tradeoff that seems to exist between corn
and soybeans, higher soybean production would suggest less corn produced, making corn
prices higher. Either way you look at it, higher biofuel production means higher input
prices at the farm-level. This does not often translate into a significant markup of costs in
developing countries. In high income countries the value added along the supply chain
after leaving the farm tends to be where the true costs of food begin to add up, making
food prices more sensitive to increases in energy prices for transporting and processing
food. This is not the case for developing countries. Low-income countries have shorter
supply chains with less value added, they primarily eat staple foods. And their food prices
are more sensitive to farm-level costs.
Demand for biofuels puts upward pressure on prices, but was it a major driver in
the price increases seen over the last decade? Higher U.S. corn prices in 2007/08 would
not lead us to expect an increase in corn exports. However, this is what we saw: increases
in ethanol use, and increases in exports. Farmers got wind of the increasing growth of the
ethanol industry, planted more corn, and harvested record crops. With a reduced grain
production in Europe, a weak dollar, and strong world economic growth (at the time),
U.S. exports increased along with ethanol production. These exports declined once the
dollar strengthened, the world economy slowed, and world grain production recovered
(Westhoff 2010). This year we saw a similar drop in exports of corn, soybeans, and wheat
in mid September, resulting from Russia ending its export ban, and supply in the black
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sea region flooding markets. Reminding us of how interconnected the factors are,
domestically and globally (HFP 2011).
Increased investment and growth in the ethanol industry raised corn prices in
2006 and 2007, but the biofuels industry does not seem to hold as much responsibility for
the price increases of late 2008 and early 2011, given the slowed growth, idol, and even
shutdown ethanol plants. One thing remains certain biofuel demand from any crop results
in displaced agricultural land, ―Unless there is an offsetting factor, the result would be at
least some reduction in crop or livestock production and an increase in food prices‖
(Westhoff 2010).
Perhaps this is too lenient an assignment of responsibility to the industry. For our
purposes, we will continue to avoid biofuel policy issues; these are discussed at length in
a later section. Although, dissociation of the policies and politics surrounding the issue,
do serve to discredit the effect it has on prices, however we will restrict ourselves for all
intensive purposes to the production practices, supply and demand elements. Biofuels are
said to distort food markets. In their use of corn and vegetable oils, their encouragement
of land use (okay so a little bit on the policy side), and their sparking of financial
speculation biofuel production has made a bad name for itself. Well then, what are the
redeeming qualities? Are biofuels the answer to a greener less oil dependent future?
In true economic fashion, our mantra again, it depends. If we are talking about
U.S. biofuel production using corn, ethanol production, then we are growing closer and
closer to a no. If it's Brazilian biofuel production from sugar cane, then we see the
benefits in a more powerful presence. What are the differences? Personally I like the
description given by Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, "'Ethanol is like
cholesterol...good ethanol helps to tackle the pollution of the planet and is competitive.
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Bad ethanol depends on the fat of subsidies'" (Foley 2008). By good ethanol Lula was
referring to Brazil's sugar-cane based industry. Known to be more efficient, with "an
energy balance seven times greater than ethanol produced from corn" (Budney 2007).
Production costs less, uses less land, reduces more GHG emissions, is less carbon
intensive, and is more productive (Goettemoeller 2007).
As far as costs are concerned, perhaps U.S. Ethanol production may have
minimal upward pressure in food prices, it certainly comes with a price to the
Government, the OECD "estimates that biofuel support costs between USD 960 to USD
1700 per tonne of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide equivalent) saved‖ (OECD 2008).
Moving forward with biomass, switchgrass, wood chips, and maybe even yard waste has
the potential to serve the purposes of the biofuel goals better than current corn ethanol
processes. In fact Ken Vogel from the University of Nebraska's Agricultural Economics
Department found switchgrass ethanol delivers 540 percent of the energy used to produce
it, much more appealing than the 25 percent more energy return we receive on corn based
ethanol. Even more optimistic, ―switchgrass shows great tolerance to heat, drought, and
nitrogen stress‖(Schill 2007).
Despite the encouragement and the intentions of lowering greenhouse gas
emissions, biofuels have a larger impact on the environment than burning fossil fuels.
Between land use changes, irrigation, fertilization, residue burning, and tillage both
maize-based and sugarcane based biofuels are worse for the environment than fossil
fuels. When you analyze the carbon life cycle of the process you can come up with net
gains or net losses, but this is not the only analysis needed to determine the full
environmental impact biofuel production has in regards to its minimal gain in reduced
GHG emissions. In a study earlier this year, researchers found, ―direct N2O emissions
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from sugarcane fields due to nitrogen (N) fertilization result in an emission factor of
3.87±1.16% which is much higher than suggested by IPCC (1%)‖ (Lisboa 2011).
Even earlier research done in 2009 suggests similar conclusions of the
environmental impact of biofuel production, but in terms of water use. Sugar cane based
ethanol uses 2,500 liters of water for every 1 liter of ethanol produced. Soya ethanol uses
on average 14,000 liters of water for every 1 liter of biodiesel, and has even less
favorable ratios in Aisia than Western Europe. The study notes, use of the whole plant
versus just the sugar, starch or oil will reduce the water demands. However, this then
questions the resulting byproducts from ethanol production being used for feed. If more
of the plant is used in production, then less of the feed is available. Instead of the food or
fuel debate we enter a drink or drive debate (U of Twente 2011).
Biofuel production increases prices at the farm level, translating into market
effects across the board. Variations of efficiency exist for production and its ability to
reduce GHG emissions. The production process currently has a more costly impact on the
environment than benefit. The policy encouragement for biofuel production is also a cost
driver, which we discuss in a later section. Corn-based ethanol seems to be the least
beneficial pathway to biofuels. Other biomass substances have the potential to replace
corn-based ethanol, with more powerful net gains.
The biofuel industry is not largely responsible for recent price spikes, however the
policies for biofuels and speculation surrounding industry news have a larger
responsibility than the actual production itself, again an issue we address in the policy
section of this paper. Thus in terms of the production process itself, the biofuel industry
does add upward pressure of prices in the food market, however it is not as large of a
player in recent price spikes as other factors. Table 4.2 puts the scope of studies on the
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impact of biofuels into a little bit grander perspective. Put together by the World Bank in
August of 2011, the table gives some empirical findings for the impact of biofuels on
food prices.
As you can see, the wide array of estimates leads us to conclude there must be
several discrepancies surrounding the core data. It is with these results that we question
methods and modeling capabilities. Each study is going about things in so different a way
that comparing them is a new game in itself. All the global food index percentages tend
to be within the 6-10% range, when taken over a shorter term basis, but the long run
measurements, 2002-2008 seem to attribute a large markup in food inflation to the
biofuel industry. Perhaps it is due to the rapid growth of the industry seen at this time.
TABLE 4.2 Estimated Percentage of Food Inflation due to Biofuels

Source: The World Bank Development Research Group Environment and Energy Team August 201 [Hachman 2011]
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Chapter 4.2 Income Growth
A fair amount of current literature attributes the recent price increases of food to
shifting diets in India and China. The income growth of these ―emerging economies‖ are
said to shift demands for food, so much so that the prices of food world wide are being
impacted. The basic premise resides around the notion of rising incomes in china and
India are causing people to shift their diets, consuming less grains and more meat.
Further, this additional demand for meat is driving the price of grains up as well with the
increase in demand for feed. Higher incomes would then be responsible for upward
pressure on prices of food from an increased demand of meat, consequently of feed.
Sounds believable enough, large populations of people shifting their diets pull prices
upwards. Although, the nature of the recent price strikes were rather sudden and spiked
steeply within a few months span. This demand for meat did not pop up out of nowhere,
the changes in incomes did not occur suddenly. However, when China makes up almost
one-fifth of the world's population, and India not far behind with 17.4 percent it's hard to
dismiss the effect changing diets would have on world food markets.
There are myths and realities surrounding the growing concerns of, ―Who Will
Feed China?‖ as Lester Brown's 1995 book title asks. For the past three decades China
has been a net food exporter, so why are we caught up on who is going to feed China?
―Claims during the 2006-2008 food crisis that increased demand for food in China and
India was the key factor in the sharp rise in prices have been shown to be without much
substance‖ (UN 2009). In fact China seems to transcend the notions of scarcity,
increasing production without sacrificing production in other sectors. China, with 8
percent of the world's land, feeds 20 percent of the world's population, and remains 90
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percent self-reliant. Perhaps each additional unit of income is already having a smaller
and smaller effect on food, China's income growth could have reached this level. Only
with all it's self-sufficiency China has turned to the world for one commodity. The oilseed
sector sees China as, ―the largest importer in the world‖ (Westhoff 2010). Diets in China
are changing, consuming more meat, poultry, and dairy. Rather than importing these
items, China is importing soybeans.
Let's first understand China's behavior in terms of key commodities. As far as
grains go, China tends to be self-sufficient and isolated. Net trade in grains amounts to
less than 1 percent. However, in Soybeans China imports around 82 percent of China's
domestic consumption. Policies of self-sufficiency lead the income growth effect in
China to stay relatively isolated from world prices. However, in the Soybean market
China has become more open to world trade, ever since 1990. Here in figure 4.2 this
behavior is reflected in China's utilization balances (Tyner 2008; Heady 2010). These
increased demands for Soybeans suggest Soybean crushers in China are turning to
outside markets to meet feed demands. Feed for the hogs, cattle, sheep, and chickens
Chinese people afford to eat. Decreases in grain demand become offset by the increases
in oilseed meals for animal protein.
Soybean meal use by China has more than doubled from 2000 to 2008 (15mmt to
32mmt). Along with it, production of milk, chicken, beef, and pork have increased
significantly. Now, let's not get hasty and remember our talk of population growth. From
2000-2008 the Chinese population increased by over 85 million. In any case, with a
population as large as it is, china actually shifting its diet has an effect on food markets.
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FIGURE 4.2 China's Supply Utilization Balances for Major Grains and Soybeans

SOURCE: Abbott 2011: Purdue university, Farm Foundation Issue Report

That effect gets determined by the time of shift, and whether domestic
markets are prepared to handle the outcomes, otherwise policy incentives and export
tariffs on commodities can only go so far. If the demand is not met, China will, as it has
in soybean meal, turn to the world market. In doing so, cause a rippling across the food
system worldwide. ―Grain and oilseed prices may be part of a general commodity boom
that is surely being driven, at least in part, by rapid economic growth in developing
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economies‖ (Abbott 2011). China's role in driving prices has been exaggerated.
The increase in Soybean demand is said to remain limited to building up stocks,
which are now at 37 percent of use. As far as grains go, China's lack of openness became
more evident this year. Drought threatened wheat crops in China; however the news did
not result in price increases, because Chinese wheat stocks have always been high.
Should the drought cause a major decrease in supply, China will resort to drawing on
those stocks. However, increases in income and globalization have lead to changes in
consumer preferences regarding the quality and safety of agriculture products. The retail
food sector in China is growing rapidly. Consumers want more convenience, higher
quality, value-added foods.
Yet their persistence in policies to remain self-sufficient lead to strains on land
and water resources. The agriculture sector in China is a product of China's history of
central planning and Government run monopolies (Westhoff 2010). Land intensive grain
production ―has a high opportunity cost in land-scarce China‖ (Gale 2002). Markets in
China lack the logistics of other high-income countries, ―transportation and logistics costs
account for an estimated one-fifth or more of retail prices, much higher than in developed
countries‖ (Gale 2002). Liberalization of China's agricultural trade in conjunction with
joining the WTO hurt rural farmers, the peasants.
Accession commitments of reducing agricultural import protection, and
eliminating agriculture subsidies are set to make China more dependent on world
markets. Even further, to upset the livelihoods of the massive amounts of people
dependent on agriculture for income. Lack of investment in the agriculture industry,
ecological limitations, and industrialization, built up to the strains China now faces.
Export-oriented industrialization has lead to inequality between Urban and rural
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populations.
Corruption, taxes, and price discrimination in regards to agricultural products has
added to this inequality. Displacement of farmers will lead to further dependence on
world markets for soybeans, cotton, sugar, and possibly other commodities. Violent
protests mark the growing discontent of the peasant population. The Communist Party
rose to power on the backs of peasants. Ironically, development has left peasants worse
off. Changes in Chinese incomes and food system dynamics are leading to more open
markets. Perhaps the self-sufficiency has held back the full effects of these changes,
however, the stresses within the country are building up. Likely further dependence for
agricultural products will fall to outside markets (Bello 2009).
China's shifting diet, and increased demand for food has already caused shifts in
land use in Brazil. Forests are being burned, additional land cultivated, because there is a
demand for soybeans to the emerging market of China. Agribusinesses are more than
eager to be the ones who satisfy Chinese demands. Perhaps these shifts have little effect
on prices of foods in the short-run. ―The rise in Chinese demand for food contributed
little to the contemporary food price increase‖ (Bello 2009). The environmental impact it
is causing will unlikely go unnoticed in future prices.
India also demonstrates self-sufficient policies disconnecting domestic grain
markets from world grain markets (Timmer 2008; Abbott 2011). Given the country's
culture, meat is avoided by much of the population; income growth has resulted in an
increased demand for poultry and dairy. In China this increase in demand was happening
slowly with changes in the income effect, the surges in demands we saw were in
responses to replenishing stocks. However, the demand for feed was increasing, with the
―meatification‖ of Chinese Diets. India largely Hindu, and vegetarian, sees beef as a
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taboo food. However, poultry, fish, and even pork are acceptable meats. Demand
increases for meat are met mostly with poultry. Dietary changes in India occurred on two
fronts: income-induced, and globalization induced.
Economic growth during the 80s resulted in increased demands for food, except
the type of food remained traditional. Globalization changes in diet brought about
demand involving more Western diets: foods with higher oils and sugars, processed
foods, and more convenient foods. Globalization saw increases in demand for animal
products, and some vegetables. Negative income elastic foods have experienced a
decrease in demand, rice and some cereals. Consistent with Engel's theory, increases in
per capita income reduced demand for cereals, and increased demand for non-cereal food
items. This shift tends to be correlated with modernization of agriculture (Mittal 2006).
Surprisingly Mittal's paper presents a positive outlook to the situation, ―the growing
demand for livestock products gives an opportunity to increase incomes and employment
and to reduce poverty in rural areas‖ (Mittal 2006). Only, the rural agricultural sector has
not seen this increase in income as a result of production shifts to compensate the
increase in population, and the new dietary patterns of India.
India's top food imports include: Sugars, dried vegetables, coffee, spices, dairy
products, and cereals (Import export databank 2010). India's growth has come with a
tradeoff, ―India‘s supply of arable land is second only to that of the United States, its
economy is one of the fastest growing in the world, and its industrial innovation is
legendary‖ (Sengupta 2008), except its neglect of the agricultural sector has resulted in an
inability to produce enough wheat and rice to meat population demands. Agribusinesses
have come into the country by way of globalization. The impact has been devastating on
the agricultural sector, ―a decade and a half of globalization's perverse rules have led to

65
200,000 farmers committing suicide because they couldn't make a living anymore—all
there money goes to make profit for Monsanto or Cargill‖ (Shiva 2008).
Media tells us Indians are getting richer, and are eating more. Yet underneath the
growing GDP percentages, India has more hungry people than Africa. About a million
kids, under the age of five, per year die due to the lack of food. Malnutrition is a huge
issue for Indian children as well. ―Per capita entitlement to food has dropped in a decade
and a half from 177 kg to 152 kg per year‖ (Shiva 2008). India used to be food selfsufficient, food was affordable. However, globalization and liberalized trade, and perhaps
population growth, stretched this growing economy to its limits. Agriculture accounts for
52 percent of employment in India, with a population as large as India‘s this is more than
a cause for alarm.
Most farms in India are small and rain-fed, also the infrastructure presents serious
drawbacks, ―a long and inefficient supply chain means that the average farmer receives
less than a fifth of the price the consumer pays‖ (Sengupta 2008). India thus has the
potential to be self-sufficient, and even an exporter in the food markets, however
inefficiencies over time have added up to a loss in capabilities of its agricultural sector to
keep up with demand. One food item India does export in large quantities is buffalo meet,
which is stemmed from the demand for dairy products. They use buffalo for producing
milk. Despite these positive sub-sectors, India has fallen subject to its lack of attention of
the agricultural sector. Government policies and prices are not helping the situation.
When the domestic market lacks the capability, and/or the incentive to produce the crops
demanded, India turns to world markets. Given it's sheer numbers ―When [India] goes to
market to import, it typically puts pressure on international market prices, and every time
India goes for export it increases the supply and therefore mitigates the price levels‖
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(Sengputa 2008).
The trends in China and India don't have to be isolated to these two emerging
economies. Taking a look at the world increases in demand for foods will allow us to see
this trend is global, although the percentage of the world population held by India and
China does mean a fair amount of global trends are generated by these two countries.
Demand for meat shown in figure 4.3, gives us a picture of demand growths for meat in
relation to population growth. Production has increased substantially, while per capita
consumption has been growing along with the population (Trostle 2008). The increases in
meat consumption translate into an increased demand for feed; one pound of beef takes
roughly 7 pounds of feed. Per capita consumption of grains and oilseed are not increasing
as steeply as this might imply. Yet there is a persistent demand for feed, that logically
grows along with meat demand.
FIGURE 4.3: Global Meat, production, per capita consumption, and population
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FIGURE 4.4: Total World Grain & Oilseed

This increase in meat consumption results in a decreased demand for some
cereals. Feed consumption has increased, but per capita levels remain relatively stable.
This can be seen in figure 4.4. Per capita consumption growth has fallen below
population growth, suggesting a shift in diet. A shifting diet globally is not a new thing.
The economic growth we have seen across time is what brings about these shifts, making
the increased demand for meat, and thus feed long term trends. Naturally this occurs with
population increases.
The alarming part, that part making the upward pressure on prices is the lack of
growth in agriculture. Yield growth rates are decreasing, while land area being used for
production is increasing. However, population growth is also slowing. World economic
growth rates from 200-2007 actually showed an increase from those of the previous two
decades. Yet the dispersion of these growth rates and the dip in growth rates for 07/08
contributes to price pressures on commodities (Trostled 2008). Growing demands, with
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production not keeping up, world stocks-to-use ratios for grains and oilseeds make for
tight markets. This contributes to price increases. Increases in the demand for food
correlate with increases in demand for oil. Oil prices increase the prices of pretty much
every other product in the world. Increased demands for food, call for more energy use,
thus the stress on the crude oil market comes in a large part from the food industry.
Here we cannot help but be reminded of Malthus' population theory. Malthus
suggested mankind's development is limited by the pressures of population growth on the
availability of food. Population increasing faster than food supply would thus result in the
demise of a fair amount of the human race. Critics of Malthus boast in the apparent
ability of the human race to overcome this limit, ―technological improvements and capital
accumulation are strong enough forces and may relax the population pressure and
improve the condition of individuals, even in the presence of growing population‖
(Abramitzk, 2001). Defenders of his viewpoints claim these improvements in technology
only provide temporary increases in living standards, allowing for the impending doom
of humanity to occur in the long-run.
In the long-run population size will trump technological capabilities. Empirically
Malthusian eras have been seen in poorer societies throughout history, but much of the
evidence tends to disprove Malthus' idea of human advancement having limits in terms of
scarce resources. Our innovation has carried our will to survive and boost living
standards; population growth is thus an autonomous factor affecting the productivity of
agriculture. Population growth is seen to bring increased productivity by improving
agricultural practices, under more efficient divisions of labor. Neo-Malthusians mark
these claims as short-run observations, touting that Malthus will in the end be correct.
The human race is limited to the resources available; it is only a matter of time before the
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pressures of population growth catch up to these limits. Malthus himself recognized the
ability for advancements in technology, he understood improvements can and will be
made. However he held that there was some point at which improvements are capped:
―No man can say that he has seen the largest ear of wheat, or the largest oak
that could ever grow; but he might easily, and with perfect certainty, name a
point of magnitude, at which they would not arrive. In all these cases therefore,
a careful distinction should be made, between an unlimited progress, and a
progress where the limit is merely undefined‖
-Malthus T.R. 1798. An essay on the principle of population. Chapter IX, p72
It may seem that we are discussing a battle between optimists and pessimists. The
idealistic optimism of the human race being capable of overcoming the limits of our
environment is in conflict with the pessimism of limiting resources. It would be in our
best interest that humanity is capable of overcoming the scarcities of the earth, but
Malthus recognized not just some end point, but the narrowing to some unforeseen limit.
Meaning advancements in technology have to overcome the pressures of population on
the environment in a timely manner, else the effects will be seen. Viewing it from this
angle we have already realized Mathlus' theory in a number of societies across history
and are currently experiencing the phenomenon on a larger scale. Food supplies are not
meeting food demands; population being a key driver in the demand for food has
invariably set into motion the scarcity of food. As Malthus predicted, such limitation
bring about decreases in the standard of living. More people moving into poverty as a
result of the current food price increases would seem to directly relate to Malthus' theory
(Abramitzk, 2001).
The theory itself has had minor details be disproved, but in general the concept
seems to be extremely relevant to the recent food price increases. Malthus did in fact
recognize man's capabilities to increase their means of support. He was not theorizing the
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human knowledge was necessarily the fixed element, but population growth was
encouraged without proper financial preparations. ―Increase the demand for agricultural
labour by promouting cultivation, and with it consequently increase the produce of the
country, and ameliorate the condition of the labourer, and no apprehensions whatever
need to be entertained of the proportional increase of population‖ (Malthus 1798). He
saw agricultural investments to the laborers of the farms as the key to increasing produce.
Attempts made in another way to increase production of food were considered, ―vicious,
cruel, and tyrannical‖, and consequently they would fail. This can be interpreted to mean
a fair amount of modern attempts to increase agricultural production.
Perhaps the deeper concern is not the growth of population, but more so where the
growth is concentrated. Diverging growths in world population show that poorer
countries are growing at higher rates than the rich developed countries, this is
inconsistent with Malthus's theory, but adds to the stresses on food security. Countries
experiencing higher levels of food price volatility and scarcer resources necessary to
mitigate food crisis are the ones seeing higher population growth rates (PRB 2008). The
scarcity of resources coupled with population growth both put upward pressure on food
prices.
Chapter 5: Macroeconomic Factors
Previous factors remained fairly exclusive to the agricultural markets.
Determining the cause of recent food price inflation requires an inquiry to the
determinants surrounding inflation itself, furthermore those actions in the
Macroeconomic realm that influence commodity prices. Underneath all the supplyutilization events we find fluctuating macroeconomic variables. Inflationary expectations,
interest rates, business cycles, and exchange rates all reacting to stimuli in the economy
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work there way into the commodities market, and have an affect on food prices.
Interdependence exists between macroeconomics and agricultural economics. Defining
this relationship sparked attention after the agricultural price hikes in the early 1970s.
Numerous studies have sought to define this Macro-agricultural economic nexus,
and the resulting influences on food prices, and farm incomes. Literature dedicated to
analyzing the impact of macroeconomic variables on agricultural prices include: Orden
and Fackler (1989); Saghaian, Reed and Marchant (2002); Peng, Marchant and Reed
(2004); Asfaha and Jooste (2007); Kwon and Koo (2009); Khundrakpa & Das (2011).
Their findings denote agricultural responses to monetary shocks to be faster than other
sectors of the economy, monetary shocks can lead to overshooting of agricultural prices
in the short-run, and ―in economies with less developed financial markets, money supply
as a monetary policy instrument has a much stronger impact on agricultural prices than
interest rate‖ (Khundrakpa & Das 2011). The concept of agriculture being more flexible
to money supply changes is rooted in standardization and lower transaction costs
associated with agricultural versus manufactured goods. ―Even in the traditional
explanation through supply and demand imbalances also, as agricultural production takes
a much longer time, changes in demand will, in the short-term, get reflected more in price
changes than change in the volume of production‖ (Khundrakpa & Das 2011).
Thus we have launched a debate of theories surrounding price increases and the
macroeconomic environment, causality being the focal point. Do food prices increase via
structural shocks, and then the macroeconomic environment causes a persistence of these
increases, or do food prices increase as a result of the changes in the macroeconomic
environment, or perhaps both, the macro-agricultural nexus? Monetarists would suggest
prices increase because of ―autonomous increases in money supply, and not just a

72
reaction to accommodate real shocks in the economy‖ (Shahnoushi 2009). While on the
subject of money supply, Khundrakpa and Das found that an increase in the money
supply raises food prices, ―1% percent increases in money supply leads to a 0.32 per cent
and a 0.18 per cent increase in food and manufacturing prices, respectively‖(Khundrakpa
& Das 2011). Their work lead them to conclude, ―increase in money supply leads to a rise
in food prices, but not manufactured prices‖ (Khundrakpa & Das 2011).This paper also
indicates food price rises cause the money supply to increase, while manufacturing price
increases result in a decline of the money supply. Explanations point to the inelasticity of
food demand translating into a faster response to increases in the money supply, and
higher demands of money to satisfy an inelastic demand for these now higher food prices.
Yet we are conditioned into understanding that an increase in the money supply results in
inflationary pressures across the board. Turning to historical food price spikes, and the
U.S. money supply, perhaps we can see a relationship between the two.
Chris Riley looked for such a relationship; he found it to be a conditional
relationship, and not very strong. Food prices spiked significantly in 1975, but monetary
growth was not steep. The 80's and 90's had declines in food price growth, despite
substantial monetary growth during this time. What we begin to notice is money supply
growth not being accompanied by economic growth. Increasing economic growth is
marked by increases in productivity and consequently lower prices. However if the
money supply increases without proportional economic growth, prices do not decline
with productivity. Stable prices result from monetary growth matching economic growth.
Monetary growth in the 70s did not keep food prices stable because productivity was
decreasing. The 80s and 90s saw declines in food prices since money supply was
increasing at a slower rate than productivity was increasing (Riley 2010). This is
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consistent with our current situation of decreased productivity, slow economic growth,
and, thanks to QEI and QEII, large increases in the money supply.
The work of Kwon and Koo present an empirical study examining the global
macro-agricultural economic nexus. Using all variables as endogenous to capture the
dynamic nature of macroeconomic variables, they found aggregate macroeconomic
shocks account for 28.97%, 24.63%, and 20.70% percents of error variances in
agricultural prices, income, and exports, respectively (Kwon and Koo, 2009). However,
the macroeconomic variables account for 88.17 to 98.64% percent of own variations,
making this influence one sided. Intra-agricultural relationships are strong, ―the variations
of agricultural income and exports are due to shocks in agricultural price by 30.18% and
42.86%, respectively‖ (Kwon and Koo, 2009). The reverse however only amounts to
minimal effects on agricultural price by exports and income, 17.24% and 5.27%
respectively. Exchange rates and interest rates have the largest impact of all the
macroeconomic factors on the agricultural sector, with exchange rates and interest rates
accounting for 13.52% and 8.11% percent of agricultural price variations. Money supply
shock was found to consistently account for 5% percent of agricultural income variation
(Kwon and Koo, 2009).
Thus we are given an idea of the relative magnitude of the relationship between
the macro-economy and the agricultural economy. Historical observations lead to the
following conclusion, ―expansionary (contractionary) monetary policies and the
depreciation (appreciation) of the U.S. dollar were followed by prosperous (depressed)
agricultural economy along with the increase (decrease) of agricultural prices and
exports‖(Kwon and Koo, 2009). Empirical analysis confirms these observations, and
suggests magnitudes within the dynamic nexus. The influences of the macro-economy on
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the agricultural economy are of concern when determining monetary and fiscal policies.
It would seem logical to discuss food inflation under the context of general
inflation. We have seen the food price spikes occur in real terms as well as in nominal, in
varying degrees across regions, but for the most part the spikes are not mitigated too
much by adjusting for inflation. Relative agricultural prices are systematically altered by
the same macroeconomic variables that generate general inflation. Money prices (interest
rates), inflation, and exchange rates all alter agricultural prices (Grennes & Lapp, 1986).
The food price spike in the U.S. during the 1970s was argued to be ―considerably the
result of macroeconomic factors‖ (Apergis & Reziti 2011).
Food and energy prices make up a large share of CPIs. Thus higher food prices
mean higher inflation, unless you are looking at core inflation which excludes food and
energy prices due to their volatility. Also, food expenditures account for larger amount of
consumption in developing and emerging economies, making their CPIs more vulnerable
to food price fluctuations. In a 2008 report the IMF noted that there might be a process of
convergence to world prices driven by high food prices in neighboring countries.
Domestic prices are found to be the result of external sectors determining inflation, in the
long-run. This long-run time frame may come into play more once we consider the
transmission time of a price shock in the external economy to be passed through to retail
prices, and vice versa. The IMF, ―estimates of an average propagation lag of about 9-12
months for the transmission of oil price shocks, and up to 30 months for the transmission
of food price shocks‖ (Groen 2011).
Particular attention has been paid to exchange rates, since commodities are quoted
in dollars, the appreciation and depreciation of the dollar becomes an area for volatility to
sneak into prices. Exchange rates demand strategic attention from market stakeholders.
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Exchange rates in today's global financial world have a large impact, trade levels in the
market will always differ along with exchange rates as long as there are differences in
currency values. ―Food prices measured in dollars increase when the dollar weakens
against other currencies and decrease when the dollar strengthens‖ (Westhoff 2010).
World prices never tell us the whole picture, it becomes relevant to admit the indicators
discussed are useful, but imperfect. Prices change daily, and regionally; the price a farmer
in Nebraska receives for their corn can be significantly different from the price a poultry
producer in Carolina buys corn.
Now stretch this difference across currencies and you have opened yourself up to
larger price differentials. The U.S. exports most of their corn to Japan and Mexico. The
prices drop and rise according to not only the price of the corn itself in dollars, but also in
terms of the yen to dollar ratio; ―the price of corn measured in dollars only fell by 1
percent between December 2006 and December 2008, the same price measured in yen
fell by 23 percent‖ (Westhoff 20110). This same time period saw an increase in the price
of corn by 21 percent in terms of pesos. Yet the exchange rate alone does not always have
as strong of an incentive for imports as expected. The amount of corn imported by Japan
during this time, did not reflect the expectations the exchange rate difference would
expect to bring about in Japan. The strengthening of the dollar against the peso did seem
to decrease the demand for U.S. corn, as one would expect.
The main premise here being, food prices generally denominated in dollars will
cause the price of food to increase when the dollar depreciates for two reasons: lower
prices in terms of other currencies increase demand for US food imports, and the increase
of US domestic demand also puts upward pressure on food prices since exports are now
more expensive. Crude oil is also denominated in dollars, making dollar depreciation a
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main factor in demand for oil imports world wide (Trostle 2010). And suddenly the
interconnection between exchange rates, inflation, demand for energy, and demand for
food begin to impress.
Currency appreciation decreases a countries balance of trade. If this along with
net factor income and net transfer payments add to a deficit for a country's current
account, then this country is spending more on foreign trade than it is earning. Current
account deficits lead to an increased demand of foreign currency, more than it receives
from exports. Its own country's currency being supplied more than foreign demand,
consequently the exchange rate lowers. Prices become cheaper via exchange rate
lowering, until there is enough demand for cheaper exports and imports are too
expensive.
So we have established foreign demand's role in influencing the exchange rate.
Things that affect this further include: public deficits, terms of trade, political stability,
differentials in interest rates, and differentials in inflation. Indirectly, directly,
interdependently these factors influence exchange rates, and food prices. So when we say
the price of food has spiked in recent years, we cannot really make so many assumptions
on aggregate influences on prices. Price decomposition is in itself imperfect. Our
inferences on any one of these factors are imperfect. Less we limit ourselves here, it
becomes increasingly important to establish ourselves at the root of complexities. Food
price increases affect behaviors, and the reverse remains as true as ever in recent price
spikes (Gittins 2005).
Chapter 6: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy
In true social science fashion analysis should include the role of inflationary
expectations, information, and speculation. Expectations in the world of macroeconomics
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often become cases of self-fulfilling prophecies. Expectations presumably affect people's
behaviors. In turn expectations affect economic decisions, decisions regarding savings,
investments, consumption choices, wage negotiations, and more. Consequently the real
economic activity becomes influenced by inflation expectations. Central banks monitor
these expectations, using market-based and survey-based measures, to align monetary
policy objectives with current inflationary expectations.
Brazil gives us an excellent example; twenty years ago they had hyperinflation.
The currency at the time, cruzeiro was unstable. Printing new money, regime changes
coming in and out freezing prices, then failing, citizens expected the money to not hold
value. Finally four economists came up with a plan to trick people into thinking money
will hold its value. They denominated everything in terms of URVs (Unit of Real Value).
Prices in URVs remained constant, however the current currency stayed in use. URVs
were worth varying amounts of cruzeiros, but everything was listed in URVs: taxes,
wages, all prices. Eventually this ―fake‖ currency became the new currency of Brazil,
thus the Real was born. The result, ―inflation did end, and the country's economy turned
around. In the years that followed, Brazil became a major exporter, and 20 million people
rose out of poverty‖ (JOFFE-WALT 2010).
What were expectations doing during the recent food price spikes? Looking at
Figure 6.1, we see US food inflation being graphed against inflation expectations. After
the food price spike of 2008, the correlation between expectations and food prices
becomes significantly stronger. This could be from the concerns of consumers being more
focused on food prices in general, this also closely follows energy prices. Given the
economic recession that hit, the anchoring of expected inflation could have been thrown
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FIGURE 6.1: US Food Prices and US Inflation Expectations

Source: IMF, St. Louis Fed

off and now increased volatility can be seen. Most attribute this change to the actions of
the Fed. However it is not isolated to the US. An IMF working paper on inflationary
expectations and monetary policy in India found the same trend, ―prices of primary
articles account for a little under a third of expected inflation, reflecting the importance
of food prices, in particular, to people in anticipating future inflation‖(Patra 2010). The
paper found 40 percent of the variations in inflation expectation can be contributed to
food and fuel price changes. Expectations and food prices are a two way street, a
conditional two way street, that up until recently was seen to be weakening. Studies were
beginning to find the Phillips curve was becoming flatter, inflation expectations seemed
to be responding less than previously to economic variations. However, this insensitivity
has dropped away since the recession, volatility has been coming in across the board
economically (Patra 2010; Hester 2008).
This should come as no surprise, the economic environment under these price
spikes have raised people's concerns to the economy. Inflation expectations are indeed
becoming un-anchored; the Fed uses expectations for their policy strategies. With
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everyone panicking about their nest-eggs, inflation expectations saw a pop up to 20 year
highs at the beginning of 2008. The Fed's actions to fight the recession, have not led to
mitigation of inflation expectation volatility. Thus the importance of inflationary
expectations on food prices has become more important during these past two price
spikes. The interaction between spikes in food prices and inflation expectations have
augmented other economic shocks, simply through the power of behavior responding to
environmental stimuli: expectations of ―sticky‖, or higher food prices to come (Luca
2010).
Chapter 7: Speculating on Speculation
Short-term volatility in markets has a lot to do with information. The power of
news in affecting prices, granted this news has implications regarding economic activity
in markets, is impressive. Information in an economy is what presumably leads to
efficient allocation of resources. The ways in which information is generated and used in
the various financial vehicles become ever more important. Prices under a neoclassical
mind frame are indicators of scarcity and value. Sadly the exploiting of such information
in markets by certain agents tends to result in markets being distorted, rather than an
―invisible hand‖ bringing things to equilibrium.
Keynes‘ Chapter 12 in his ―General Theory‖ addresses speculation, in perhaps one
of the best accounts of the psychology of panic. ―Speculators may do no harm as bubbles
on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the
bubble on a whirlpool of speculation‖ (Keynes 1936). Financial innovation makes
investments more liquid, reducing the demand for cash, but increasing the scope of
speculation, and consequently increasing volatility. This is exactly what we have seen in
today‘s markets, the ―social purpose‖ of financial markets are not being realized. ―When

80
the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino,
the job is likely to be ill-done‖ (Keynes 1936).
At the hands of speculators, commodities markets have been another source for
rising food prices. People like Dwight Anderson entertained us, ―with stories from the
world of big money‖ (Balzi 2008). Tight supplies in Brazilian grain farms and Malaysian
Palm Oil Plantations made him excited. Completely aware of the rises in world hunger
that would result, he focused only on the profitability. He was ―The Commodities King‖
on his throne, the largest in the world: Ospraie Hedge Fund. Betting on agricultural
markets, and flaunting the investment bargains worldwide hunger brought him, soon
brought a negative light. He now owns the rights to all photos of himself and avoids the
media, shame?
Commodity speculation has been given a bad reputation. Futures markets are a
place for farmers and grain wholesalers to find protection; protection against weather and
excessive price fluctuations. These markets allow for a farmer to plan on how much to
plant for a given year, allows them to sell their harvests ahead of time. Futures contracts
allow locked in quantities, prices, and delivery dates. These can stretch into crops that
have yet to be planted. Speculators reach in, buying at lower prices, betting they will rise
and making a profit. Investors are said to have flooded the market, driving up short term
prices. These profit-hungry investors are not the familiar market participants. Farmers
and silo operators are being crowded by large index funds. Never taking delivery of a
given crop, these investors do not see themselves as a cause to price increases. Futures
prices do affect real world behaviors, but we have to decipher how much of the price
movements are due to unjustified speculation versus the fundamentals of supply and
demand.
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ABN Amro a financial giant offered up their innovation to the profit-oriented
members when they ―became the first bank to offer certificates allowing small investors
to place bets on rising rice prices on the Chicago Futures Exchange‖ (Balzi 2008). Asia's
most important staple food was falling subject to famine, hunger and political unrest were
the talk amongst experts worldwide, meanwhile ABN launched its new ad campaign, As
India imposes a ban on rice exports world rice supplies have declined to a minimum.
Traders find whatever reasons they want out there to buy sand sell contracts at a given
price: weather, exchange rates, past prices, oil prices, and all sorts of factors affecting
supply and demand for a crop. Information transfers and analysis eventually prices are
bid up to ration out available supply, or down to discourage further production.
Hindsight gives us an edge of confidence, but we are not naive. Identifying and even
understanding the movements of fundamentals doesn't give us an edge on predicting the
persistence or volatility of changes in short term supply and demand elements, or their
effects on prices. Extending this to suggest the speculative bubble has led to ―higherthan-justified prices‖, and blaming irrational speculative behavior for price spikes would
in itself be irrational. The timing would tend to favor speculation as a guilty culprit of
higher food prices. Index speculators grew seven-fold from January 2003 to March 2008;
―these speculators held 64 percent of outstanding wheat contracts in 2008‖ (Westhoff
2010). The increased volumes of money are seen to distort the futures prices from cash
prices. Then in the last months of 2008, large volumes of money flowed out of the market
as prices fell, the speculative bubble popped.
So far the timing and the ethical implications are stacking up against speculators,
they certainly look like the guilty Yet we are left to our own limitations of speculating
about speculation. Sophisticated statistics might lead us to a more clear cut answer,
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however certainly not a definitive one, but alas this is beyond the scope of this paper. The
International Food Policy Research Institute's economists found ―that speculative activity
affected market prices‖ (Westhoff 2010). The 2009 report by IFPRI evidenced this affect
through: increased ratios of noncommercial long positions to total positions in Rice and
Wheat, this same ratio but for short positions in maize and soybeans, index trader's net
positions, and ratios of volumes to open interest in wheat and rice. The study cites,
―rising expectations, speculation, hoarding, and hysteria...played a role in the increasing
level and volatility of food prices (Robles [IFPRI] 2009).
Opposing this, Scott Irwin of the University of Illinois, did not find speculation to
play an important role on market prices. If we see the market having prices be high,
without these fundamentals concluding that market prices should be high, then we could
probably point to speculators as being a dominant driver in food prices. Yet the market
fundamentals lead us to see little by way of anomalies caused purely by speculation.
Noting also, speculation based on fundamentals would translate into prices that reflect
fundamentals and not profit hungry investor's actions. So, the intentions of those actions
may not be outright malicious. We can look at past corn prices and say they did not need
to be as high as they were in 2007/2008, and that we would indeed have as much as we
did in 2008/2009 without such high prices. Except we did not know this at the time, and
as it became clear production was meeting demand, prices fell in the last months of 2008.
Speculation can be a good thing, or a bad thing for food markets. They provide liquidity,
and have been known to mitigate volatility over time. Still, if prices are driven away from
fundamentals, prices will be distorted.
Outside of the contract world, there are options, swaps, and other tools used to
hedge risks, or bet on price movements. Government regulations are around in the
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market, they have disciplines in place to restrict market distortions. Arguments on these
measures will continue on. We can decipher better methods to determine the role
speculation plays on markets, but we do already know one thing: ―market speculators can
push prices higher or lower, but fundamentals eventually rule‖ (Westhoff 2010). Now the
more important point we can take away here are the reactions to the markets. All kinds of
institutions watch the markets, then react based off of what the market is telling them in
regards to the fundamentals of food supply and demand.
Some studies suggest the responses to economic shocks are not as drastic under
certain market conditions: high volumes of trade, freer trade, and more flexible macro
environments. Even further, the credibility of the regime monitoring inflation tends to
have an influence on the impacts of price swings. Another thing to note, the relationships
discussed earlier between macro and agricultural economics could be affected by the size
and endurance of price swings. Recent food price spikes were intense in size, thus the
impact ensuing may have been more lasting.
If persistent, the increases in food prices result in reductions of real consumption,
savings, and investments, these combine to lower aggregate demand dampening
economic activity. As mentioned earlier, studies have found food prices to be more
responsive than non food prices to macroeconomic variables. Further, the increase in
food prices is larger than that of non-food prices, theoretically we should then see farm
net incomes increase under conditions of inflation. This is exactly what we saw for US
net farm incomes, they rose from before 1992 up to 2008, and then they dropped from
2008 to 2009. This is consistent with our discussion of food prices having stronger
relationships with macroeconomic variables than non-food prices (Baek and Koo 2010).
In all we are seeing evidence of changes in the macroeconomic environment affecting
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performances of agricultural economies. Directly, and indirectly, and perhaps more long
term through the provoking of actions of stakeholders.
Chapter 8: Policies
Policymakers being apart of those provoked stakeholders, have been hard at work
over the recent decade. Government food policies undoubtedly affect food prices. Not to
mention the livelihoods of the 40 percent of the world's population depending on food
production for a living. Of all the debate surrounding the food price increases, one
consensus seems to be more prevalent than any other; policies are exacerbating food
price volatility. Rebuilding stocks, controlling domestic prices, and export bans are seen
as the protectionist measures raising prices higher. Tariffs raise import prices, and
occasionally spark trade wars. Subsidies boost production and give incentives for lower
food prices. Biofuel policies encourage the allocation of crops to fuel versus food, driving
prices up. Food aide programs lower food prices for beneficiaries. Conservation
programs give incentives for farmers to not plant crops, decreasing supply. Agricultural
resource can lead to new uses for crops increasing crop demand pressuring prices to
move upward, and/or introduce productivity increasing methods allowing prices to move
lower. At any given time, a country has multiple food policies, often times these policies
are contradictory.
Prices are seen as too high by one group, consumers, and too low by another
group, farmers. Farmer's want to make a decent living and consumers want food to be
affordable. Before 2007, most of these food policies have escaped our attention that is
aside from traditional farm subsidy programs. As world food prices began to rise in 2007,
Governments took action. In efforts to limit food price inflation, exporting countries
adopted export bans, or restricted exports. This allows for domestic food prices to lower
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in adjustment of increased supply. Meanwhile, importing country prices increased
reflecting the reduction in supply from exporting countries. Food importers lowered or
removed tariffs to encourage imports, which did put downward pressure on prices, but in
effect increased world prices since the world demand for imported food increased. Both
protectionist policy measures aimed to reduce domestic prices, consequently both raised
world prices. Government actions to make domestic prices more stable, can lead to more
volatile food prices in other countries. India restricted rice exports drives up the food
price of rice in Latin America and Africa (Westhoff 2010).
India was not alone in the wave of protectionist policy measures. China imposed a
tax on grain exports in 2007/2008, and their stock building strategies have raised
pressures on Soybean prices. The EU suspended export subsidies on their dairy products,
and reduced grain import tariffs. Russia's export taxes on wheat turned into bans on
wheat and coarse grain exports after its recent drought. Argentina raised export taxes on
grains and oilseeds. The Ukraine banned Wheat exports, and Vietnam banned rice
exports. In all over 30 countries restricted agriculture exports in 2007/2008, the first spike
saw restrictions on exports mostly from major exporting countries. These policy
responses have been a root cause of higher food prices.
Supply and demand fundamentals are not consistent with the sharp price
increases. Specifically in the prices of Rice for 2007/2008, ―world rice production
actually exceeded rice consumption in 2007/2008‖ (Westhoff 2010). Ending stocks were
larger than the beginning of the year rice stocks. Indicating, without these export bans
world rice prices would not be nearly as high. IFPRI ―attributed about three-quarters of
the increase in the price of rice in 2008 to government policy responses like export
restriction‖ (Stewart 2011). Such restrictions tend to lead markets into a panic;
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stakeholders see the sharp increase in food prices from a further restricted supply of food.
Now the already tight supplies are tighter, import dependent countries are forced to
accept higher prices, and everyone in the market suffers from the distortions left in the
wake of export bans. Although trade policies are not as simple as these export bans make
them out to be.
Conor Foley, a humanitarian aid worker sees Western policies as the enabler to the
food crisis. High income countries have long been criticized for their subsidy programs,
―The average European cow receives more financial support than half the world's
population has to live on‖(Foley 2008). Funding Foley feels would be better spent
developing agriculture in the South. Yet we tend to see subsidies and such funding do just
the opposite, flood out foreign developing markets with cheap(er) food. In fact when you
step back at look at the whole thing, you can find OECD trade policies are rather
indefensible. We are exacerbating if not creating the development issues we are
supposedly aiding.
―Across all OECD countries, government subsidies and policies that keep
domestic prices above world market levels account for about one-fourth of total farm
receipts‖ (Westhoff 2010). Policies differ vastly between countries. Agricultural policies
include: trade policies, subsidies, food assistance programs, and other food policies. Each
of these has specific effects on food markets, and thus food prices. Many of these are
targeted at the consumer level. Many of them have intentions beyond prices, such as
safety and regulation for health purposes. These regulations and policies can transfer
additional costs to producers and in turn be passed on to the price of food products.
Government stocks, and agricultural research projects need funding are organized
through policies. Public policies restrict or aid research, such as we have seen with
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genetically engineered crops. Environmental agricultural policies have costs, aimed at
soil erosion reduction or conservation efforts. Animal welfare rules have found a place in
the food system. Subsidies tend to get the most political attention. Despite their impacts
being more on the income of farming families than the food prices, subsidies are seen by
many of the public as the root of hunger.
One point that is abundantly clear, policies made by rich countries tend to
counteract the supposed aid efforts of these same countries. In the words of Collier from
his book, ― The Bottom Billion‖, ―It is stupid to provide aid with the objective of
promoting development and then adopt trade policies that impede that objective‖ (collier
2007). It seems particularly fitting to use a childish adjective one is generally more
accustomed to hearing on the playground. Except that is exactly what this is, a world
agricultural trade playground. Complete with bullies kicking sand around, shoving little
scrawny kids in the dirt. Teachers come along and make them apologize. They help the
little kid stand again, only to get right back at their aggressive behavior next recess. Rich
OECD countries, our bullies, undermine the benefits of trade with their subsidies, and in
the past decade with biofuel policies.
Chapter 9: Biofuel Policies
―Government support of biofuel production in OECD countries is costly, has
a limited impact on reducing greenhouse gases and improving energy security,
and has a significant impact on world crop prices, according to a new study of
policies to promote greater production and use of biofuel in OECD countries‖
(OECD 2008).
Most everyone agrees, biofuel policies increase food prices, however the jury is
still out as to the magnitude of the effects. If the costs of supporting the biofuel industry
are high, and the benefits low, then where is the reasoning for the support? Earlier we
discussed biofuel production, but now we are focusing in on the support policies adopted.
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Take away the three major US ethanol support policies, and according to a 2009 Food
and Agricultural Policy research Institute report production drops by an average 36
percent (Westhoff 2010). Under the premises of becoming energy independent and
environmentally responsible, the US boosted its biofuel industry. They put in place three
main policies to encourage the use of biofuels, subsidies, tariffs on ethanol imports, and
mandates requiring minimum use levels. Tax credits and tariffs on ethanol and biodiesel
led to an expansion of the US biofuel industry. In 2005 the Renewable Fuel Standard
(RFS) mandated biofuel use levels; throughout the years this mandate minimum has been
raised. In 2007 the US enacted the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA).
Although, in recognition of the increased corn prices from the RFS, the EISA set a
maximum for corn-based ethanol counting to wards the 2015 RFS level of 15 billion
gallons.
Expectations of industry growth caused plants to pop up everywhere, thus raising
demands for corn and soybeans used in biofuel and biodiesel production. Hence we see
the policies facilitating the upward movement of prices. The food price decline does not
coincide with any biofuel policy changes. Regulation confusions and uncertainty for the
industry did come with the economic crisis and widespread plant shutdowns. The impact
biofuel policies have on food prices are estimated to be rather high, without biofuel
policies, ―The FAPRI-MU study estimated that corn prices would fall by 13 percent‖
(Westhoff 2010). The same study estimated drops of 7.4 and 5.6 percent for wheat and
Soybeans, with the removal of biofuel policies.
There is a relationship seen between oil prices and the price of biofuels, since they
are substitutes, ―when oil prices are high, the ethanol tax credit can encourage more
ethanol production and use , which in turn causes more corn use and higher food prices‖
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(Westhoff 2010). However, these policies weaken that link between food and oil prices
when oil prices are low, since low oil prices will drop biofuel production and use to
mandated minimum levels, which will not increase demand for corn and soybeans
enough to make demand as inelastic as it is with higher oil prices.
The price impact of the industries actions may be ambiguous and draw on a fair
amount of models and assumptions to measure, but the costs of policy support tends to be
more readily available. Policies have more concise cost structures. In any case, the OECD
found, ―Current biofuel support measures alone are estimated to increase average wheat
prices by about 5 percent, maize by around 7 percent and vegetable oil by about 19
percent over the next 10 years‖ (OECD 2008).
Chapter 10: The Good Guys?
Mainstream media would have you believing the WTO rescues developing
nations, and are the ones working to solve global problems. However, what do we really
know about the actions of the WTO, further more what about the IMF, the FAO, the
World Bank, and the UN? Unfortunately, there seems to be a rather alarming track record
when you start to look into the actions of these global institutions. The mantra of ―free
trade‖ comes with strings attached for countries joining the WTO.
―third world governments 'agreed' to reduce or eliminate
tariffs, but with the Uruguay Round accord, third world countries
have through treaty law been locked into further reductions and
have lost their right to use nontariff barriers—including subsidies or
other favorable treatment for locally produced goods-- to protect
their domestic food markets‖ (Lappe 1998).
yet the Northern countries were given less strict rules. Some tariff reductions and cutting
a few farmer's subsidies, and they were good to go. The rules of the game favored
Northern countries and multinational corporations. Impartial trade policies were not
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existent, and developing nations had very little say in trade negotiations. ―The WTO...was
given far greater authority over trade in agricultural commodities than existed under the
GATT‖ (Ikred 2008). A fair amount of resistance has been building up against the WTO,
led by peasant farmers, in their plight for ―food sovereignty‖. In large part resistance is a
response to the double standards seen at the Doha Round of trade negotiations.
It seems the US is in favor of free trade for the rest of the world, but protectionism
for themselves. Free trade has left poverty in its wake in many cases. Philippines' entry
into the WTO mirrors Mexico's experiences with adhering to NAFTA. Imports in
agriculture rose substantially, lowering prices, and lowering production via lack of
incentives. Corn farmers rather leave their corn rot in a field than harvest because it
simply was not worth it with the low import prices. Campaigns to ratify came from the
World Bank handlers, promising compensations in other new export industries. Needless
to say, no such export industry materialized. In the end, ―trade liberalization was the swift
transformation of an agricultural economy with a high degree of self-sufficiency into one
that was permanently import-dependent, its small farmers steadily marginalized‖ (Bello
2009).
Critics have been after the World Bank for its conditional loans, equivocating the
bank to a war weapon. The conditions are viewed to open up under-developed economies
to corporate exploitation. The IMF and the World Bank have stumbled of late, with failed
policies and ―a credit glut brought on by spiraling oil prices‖ (Urquart 2008). With food
prices spiking to new highs, the World Bank and the IMF were given new opportunities.
With a giant PR launch, the Bank announced an available 1.2 billion for facilitating
vulnerable countries during the food crisis. Among these countries, Haiti, Libia, and
Djibouti all received grants. However, ―moves to restructure the global economy to
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protect small producers from market fluctuations and the predations of agribusiness
giants were strikingly absent from the bank's response, just as they were absent from the
outcome of the Rome Summit itself‖ (Urquart 2008). Even the FAO has become caught
up in corporate agendas. ―The FAO shut its ears to alternative notions of agricultural
development, turning its summit into a rubber-stamping exercise that put profit firmly
before people and land‖ (Urquart 2008).
FAO findings from convened International Assessment of Agricultural
knowledge, Science and Technology (IAASTD) went missing. Civil society
representatives asked to the summit were admitted through the rear entrance, given 90minutes and a strict agenda. However, according to Patrick Mulvany a senior policy
adviser for Practical Action (A UK based NGO), private sector participants were escorted
to a round table upstairs to meet with the head of the FAO, Jaques Diouf, Kofi Annan,
and of all people, representatives of agribusiness giants, among them Monsanto and
Syngenta. Even the UN is used as a diplomatic tool, complete with corruption,
infamously its Oil-for-Food Scandal in 2006 benefiting corporations. The UN has even
received allegations of collaborating with Google to de-list one of its most prominent
critics, Inner City Press. The UNDP and Google partnered up in November of 2007 to
―achieve anti-poverty goals‖, but when Inner City Press' founder Lee asked why Google
hadn't signed a global human-rights and anti-censorship contract, which are part of the
UN's Millennium Development Goals, the Website for Inner City Press was removed
from Google News.
Corruption happens, it is apart of cultures worldwide, hidden, unhidden; socially
acceptable and not. The list of market imperfections stemming from acts of corruption are
far too many for this paper to delve much further into. NGOs and governments alike out
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to provide aid in the midst of the food crisis can fall victim to misconceptions, corruption,
and diminishing returns. That's right, diminishing returns, ―when aid reaches about 16
percent of GDP it more or less ceases to be effective‖ (Collier 2007). In all aid, over the
past thirty years has only managed to increase economic growth rates in the ―bottom
billion‖ countries by 1 percent per year. Before you start shaming rich countries, and
wallowing in their guilt over the developing world's poverty know this, ―poverty is
simply the default option when economies malfunction‖ (Collier 2007). Malfunctions in
the agricultural economy take root in the supply and demand fundamentals, natural
resource scarcities and allocations, policy responses, and market imperfections. The food
system is surrounded with market imperfections. Policies are merely the icing on the
cake.
The crux of current policy controversies center around globalization. Globalizing
markets affects the global economy, ecology, and society. This is where the timeless
conundrum of conflicting rights, the rights of the individual versus society. To be more
exact we are presented with a theme in evolutionary biology – the conflict between
individual selfishness and group altruism. Economics, in the neoclassical sense tends to
favor humans as having a healthy enlightenment of self-interest governing all choices in
terms of satisfying their wants.
It is very easy to make the case for this in my own world views as well. The
gutters of the house in which I am renting a room are cluttered, to the point they will not
function come melting snow. Yet, I am moving shortly, the cost of clearing out the gutter
will not benefit me. Of course it will benefit future generations of tenants in the home. I
am not inclined to think about these tenants when deciding not to clear out the gutter. I
am leaving my environment worse off for following inhabitants. The choice to ignore
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cluttered gutters parallels our economic environment today. We are operating in the shortterm, exploiting resources. Thankfully, unlike my gutter, the world is reaching out for
sustainability in markets, sustainability in agriculture. Only the market imperfections are
hindering our abilities to do so, starving development.
Chapter 11: Market Matters
―Our current economy favors systems that exploit the natural and human environment
for short run gains‖ (Irkerd 2008).
As discussed in the biotechnology section, agriculture fell subject to
industrialization. It has been restructured under the mechanistic worldview. Operating
under neoclassical economics, the final arbitrator is the consumer. All actions adding
value to the product are aimed at satisfying the consumer's needs and wants with scarce
resources. Efficient allocation of these resources is assumed by maximizing economic
value relative to economic costs. Conventionally water, air, and land are not specifically
assigned economic value. Like every other industrial practice, agriculture began to
specialize, and standardize.
Things on the farm turned routine enough to be mechanized. Trying to make a
biological process more predictable, reliable, and repetitive has drawbacks. Farmers are
producing standardized products, making them price takers in the market. ―The only
marketing decisions conventional farmers make is to decide when to establish a price for
the things they produce‖. Using forward contracts or options, and hedging their positions
in the futures market they can manage risks. Sure they can decide to defer pricing until at
delivery, before or after delivery, but the price is set and they either take it or leave it.
Contracts requiring a fixed amount of return per unit of production helped farmer's feel
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less risk, but locked them into being, ―a contract laborer for an agribusiness corporation‖
(Ikerd 2008).
The system encourages farmers to exploit each other and natural resources. The
old economic views of best serving society by pursuing our own self-interest have proven
detrimental under current conditions. We are not witnessing competitive capitalism. The
conditions are not here, sufficient buyers and sellers, perfect information on price,
performance, and products, freedom of entry and exit, sovereignty of consumer tastes and
preferences. Today's economy is not the capitalism we read about in textbooks. We have
large corporations holding market power dominating the industry, and consolidating
further at alarming rates. Barriers to enter the agriculture industry are large initial capital
investments, patents, and copyrights.
Agriculture has not escaped the wave of industrialization and corporatization that
spawned globalization. Farmers adopted new practices, lower costs and consequently
raising profits. This meant specialized, standardized, and mechanized agriculture.
Farmers became obsessed with getting larger: produce more, farm more, more labor,
more capital. Innovation and competition led to the survival of larger farms wining out
against smaller farms. Competition wanes until you are left with capitalism giving way to
corporatism. The separation of corporate entities from their operation's performance leads
to higher risk taking behaviors, to ethics and social responsibility being reduced to
legalities. ―The overriding motive for public investment and ownership is to realize
profits and growth in economic value‖ (Ikred 2008).
Theoretical principles of competitive capitalism argue this being the best result for
society, efficient allocation of resources via free markets has led to the best outcome.
Corporations tend to not have the needs of a society at the forefront of their decision
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making grids. Capitalism is rooted in privatization, ownership by individuals, and
competition among many individual firms. Yet, ―most private property in the United
States today is owned by corporations, not individuals‖ (Ikred 2008). Capitalism did not
advocate government involvement in the economy, yet we are seeing government and
corporate interests blend. Power blocks, and ―revolving doors‖ ensure that government
and corporate boards are on the same page. The pursuit of short-run self-interests by
corporations has removed social and moral restraints to selfishness.
Take Monsanto's track record. They patented their genetically modified seeds,
sued farmers left and right for having crops that contained this seed. They illegally
dumped thousands of tons of highly toxic waste in the UK, knowing the contamination
liabilities, which were found polluting the groundwater 30 years later (Monsanto 2005).
Bribery in Indonesia, and false advertising in France, serve as two more accounts of
Monsanto‘s rather unethical footprint. If it could, India would declare war on Monsanto,
blamed as the major cause of farmer suicides, and alleged to employ children in the
manufacturing of their high cost bt cotton-seeds. The work involves handling poisonous
pesticides (Shiva 2008; Monsanto 2007). Global trade institutions tend to favor this
result, the corporations coming in and creating larger industrialized farms. The
differences in farming practices between peasants and agribusinesses can be seen in
Table 11.1.Agribusinesses are not necessarily all bad, we do have to recognize the
increased outputs, the innovation they usually bring about, table 11.1 allows a
comparison of peasant farming, and we can see the systems have pros and cons. The
productivity and output of agribusinesses are beneficial to society; however they tend to
have larger environmental and social costs within a community.
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TABLE 11.1: Peasant Versus Agribusiness

Source: Annex 11, FAO
The market structure change is not limited to agricultural industrialization. We are
seeing the elements mentioned come together to make more inelastic food markets. Price
responsiveness is being restricted by land scarcity, water scarcity, biofuel policy
constraints, higher livestock prices with persistent feed demands, lower stocks, isolation
protectionist trade policies, all come together to lower the elasticity of food markets. The
price increases in the recent decade are a direct result of the market's inability to adjust
supply and demand. All the above factors are more inelastic than they have been in the
past. Decomposing each one allows understandings, but when they combine, we are
allowed to visualize the bigger picture of why food price spikes are happening, and why
volatility in food prices has increase. Land alone has become scarcer in 2011 than in
2008, contributing to more inelastic food prices. Figure 11.1 shows the impact of shortrun inelastic demand, and decreases in supply. This is what the corn markets have seen
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with the recent price spikes, other crops have seen similar inelastic demand curves and
decreases in supply. The upward pressure of prices, with these fundamentals shifting
allowed for the price spikes. Other elements added to distortions of food markets from
long-run equilibrium as well.
Figure: 11.1 Inelastic Demand for Food and Supply Decrease

One market aspect that is not helping the situation, adding further pressure to the
price spikes, is the monopolization of the food industry. Yes we mentioned
industrialization and moving to a more mechanistic world view. Even hinted at the
market power some corporations have managed to sink their teeth into, but it is time we
looked further into the food industry. Who is bringing the food from the farm to the table?
We can see a clear change in the industry; shifts to fewer players in the industry have led
to price increases. Economics tells us the result of monopolization is higher prices, fewer
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output, and a welfare loss for society. This is exactly what we are witnessing in the food
industry, corporate consolidation of agriculture.
We have already discussed the seed market's consolidation down to 6
corporations. Three decades ago, there were dozens of pesticide companies, in 2010 just
ten companies control nearly 90 percent of agrochemical sales worldwide. Fifteen years
ago around 1,000 biotech companies started up, in 2010 just ten companies hold threequarters of the industry's revenues. Pharmaceutical companies can be considered in our
corporate takeover discussion. Fifty-five percent of global pharmaceutical sales go to ten
companies; a few names: Pfizer, Merck-Schering-Plough, Roche, Johnson & Johnson,
Sanofi Aventis, Glaxo. Over sixty percent of the US grain industry is controlled by four
companies: Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, ConAgra Incorporated, Bunge Corporation.
The US meat packing industry dwindles down to four large companies: Tyson, Cargill,
Smithfield, Swift and Company. Tyson is the world's largest meat producer. Cargill takes
corporate consolidation to a whole new level. ―With $120 billion in annual revenues,
Cargill is bigger than the economies of more than two-thirds of the world's countries,
including Kuwait, Peru, and Vietnam‖ (Windes 2010). To put this in perspective, their
sales are larger than the combined sales of Kraft Foods, PepsiCo, and Disney. The
corporate consolidation of the food industry is enough to make you sick, literally (Windes
2010).
The regulations and safety standards are questionable when these large
corporations get involved. Factory farm conditions encourage diseases. Roughly 70 to 80
percent of pigs have pneumonia when they are slaughtered (Lilly, 2002). Hormones and
antibiotics add more to the story. Hormones used to increase milk production in cattle,
brought to us courtesy of Monsanto, resulted in increases of utter infections and
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lameness. Milk from these cows had increased levels of Growth Factor One (IGF-1).
Which is known to be a fuel cell for cancer growth; it is associated with rapid cancer
growth. Hormones are carcinogenic; they disrupt DNA (Balter 1999). The more you
know about processed food, the less you wish you knew. Your local stray dogs and cats
are ground up along with their euthanasia drugs and fed to livestock. Now before you
simply object on account of this being little Bengi or Socks, the problem lies more with
the drugs inside these animals rather than the source itself (Truong 2007). More
concerning is the feeding of same species to livestock, or perhaps the dried poultry waste
and sewage sludge fed to cattle (Lilly 2002). We are what we eat.
Campaign contributions marry political agendas with corporate interests.
Consolidation has occurred in every industry from defense to agriculture. At times the
line between food and weapons becomes blended. Governments recognize the power of
actions within the food industry, and as such strategies in foreign relations often involve
using food as a weapon. The pattern appears throughout history, colonization had its
agendas. Food from colonies was a main interest for imperialists. ―In Indonesia, the
Philippines and Vietnam as well, the plantations threw back their labor forces' subsistence
requirements on impoverished peasants, who struggled to squeeze more and more from
less and less land‖ (Bello 2009). In Latin America, we saw the notorious ―latifundominifundo‖ complex. Dual economies exist, exports to support metropolitan economies
while peasants are pushed further into the outskirts and expected to support growing
populations with less resources. Bretton Woods had an agrifood system leading to further
protectionists policies for food, and ultimately an exclusion of agriculture from the GATT
(General Agreement on Tarriffs). Transitioning us into the current predilections against
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the WTO we covered earlier. Perhaps a more clear distinction of food as a weapon is the
outright withholding of food aid in efforts to control a political outcome.
Stalin and Hitler used food as a reward, a punishment, and to destroy opposition.
During the Cold War, food was used as a form of influence and propaganda. Food aid in
most any situation between countries is not as innocent as publicly perceived. Granted
today food is generally not embargoed for humanitarian purposes, but the practice of food
as a leverage in geopolitical strategies is very much active. Economic sanctions are an
implementation of international policy, and the role food plays within this often leads to
genocidal starvation, which is still an accepted strategy. There are reports of these
practices occurring all over the world, of course most of the allegations are underground
and not credited, and thus many of them fall to conspiracy. Yet the historical accounts of
food as a weapon are readily available. The lack of humanitarian interests when a
powerful country, or any regime for that matter, determines their agendas are carried out
by such means is sickening (Bello 2009).
Chapter 12: Summary
'[T]his time there will be no ―silent tsunami‖. The situation is
different from 2008. The world is aware of the risks. The
global community, the UN and Bretton Woods system, is fully
engaged, more coherent and prepared to act . . . .‖
-Paul Gulleik Larsen
Director of Multilateral and NGO Relations
UN World Food Programme
February 18, 2011
The past decade has experienced two alarming food price spikes. The causes and
responses have launched the world into as frenzy of analysis and projections, reforms,
and plan implementations. In the midst of economic turmoil, the food crisis has led to
setbacks in development. The above factors have contributed to recent food price spikes.
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A full table of factors and their relative effects can be viewed in Appendix E. The table
demonstrates the relative magnitude of these elements in the price spikes of the past
decade. As you can see the magnitudes are not decisive, complex matters of economic
environments need to be established in order to reach more conclusive quantitative
results. Long term factors are seen as have upward trend influences on food prices, and
are given one plus in the final two columns of the chart to indicate their influences
accordingly. Thus the chart found in Appendix E. is not exclusive to the factors causing
the spikes in food prices, but are in whole the factors providing upward, or downward, as
the case may be pressure on food prices. In the case of no assignment, the influential
relevance is simply minimal enough to be excluded,
Table 12.2: Governments' Policy affects on Food Prices
Domestic Food
World Food
Prices
Prices
Tariffs and Import Restrictions
Higher
Lower
Export Subsidies
Higher
Lower
Payments to farmers
-tied to current production
Lower
Lower
-not tied to current production
Small
Small
Farm Input Subsidies
Lower
Lower
Land Retirement Programs
Higher
Higher
Public Stock Management
More Stable
More Stable
Biofuel Policies
Higher
Higher
Price Ceilings
Lower
Higher
Domestic Food Assistance
-effect on beneficiaries
Lower
-----effect on others
Higher
Higher
Research and Educaiton
Depends
Depends

Policy reactions to
recent food price spikes
have exacerbated the food
crisis. Table 12.2 displays
governments' policies and
their effects on both
domestic and world food
prices. Many countries
have conflicting policies

source: Westhoff, 2010 page 207

acting within the food industry. Actions of global institutions are impacting the world
food crisis. The change of agriculture into an industrialized mechanistic practice should
be addressed further. The market imperfections seen have resulted in starving
development. During the recent food price spikes, we have seen supply and demand
fundamentals indicate market disequilibrium. It is important to note, a fair amount of
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these factors are not unique to the food price spikes, but are rather a collection of food
price influences on long term trends. That is to say land and water availability are not
unique to the spikes, but are leading to the overall upward trend in food prices across the
long run. Imperfections by way of policy responses, more inelastic markets, information
flows and expectations, and corporate consolidation of the industry lead to further
disequilibrium. All of which have interacted to create the growing volatility of food
prices.

Chapter 13: Case Studies
There comes a time when merely overviews of all the elements driving food
prices become trivial. All these factors affect specific country economies uniquely; even
further the differentials amongst regions vary, and further still are the differences amongst
individual stakeholders. Food price increases should then be addressed on a case by case
basis. Only by analyzing the drivers under specific contexts can the price increase be
quantified, that is to the best of our current modeling abilities. In an effort to reach a more
quantitative conclusion on the recent food price spikes we look at three case studies.
These three case studies center around countries: Greece, Pakistan, and Asia. The
previous discussions tended to take a horizontal approach to the impact of food price
increases. We looked at specific drivers and their roles on world prices, or often times just
in the US. In discovering the impact of recent food price increases on a country case
level, we can be more definitive in the economic environment, and create more exact
results than we have on the global scale.
Greece has been given a fair amount of attention over the past few months,
making for a rather interesting case study in terms of economic environments in relation
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to the recent food price spikes. Nicholas Apergis and Anthony Reziti performed an
analysis of food price volatility in Greece. Wanting to see how the volatility of food
prices are affected by short-run deviations between food prices and macroeconomic
factors. When there is an increase in the volatility of food prices as a result of shocks to
the system, then investigating the behavior of conditional variance as a function of shortrun deviations from the equilibrium path allows for a measurement of the shocks impact
on food prices, and possible costs associated.
A positive effect would show short-run deviations affect conditional means, and
variances. The farther food prices deviate from these macroeconomic factors in the short
run, the more uncertainty there is, making predictions of food prices harder. The
modeling here is taken from Engel's ARCH model, autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity. Observed time series data of the macroeconomic conditions are used
to model conditional heteroskedasticity as a function of lagged error correction terms. If
the uncertainty is serially correlated the ARCH model serves as a method for
measurement. To include more information the general model is extended to use the
GARCH-X model. It allows for a term to be added denoting short-run deviations, it is a
squared lagged error-correction term often written simply as EC, error correction.
The method requires modeling food prices as a function of macroeconomic
variables in the long-run, the cointegration vector function can be viewed in figure 13.1.,
this is the second vector regression the study develops. The first did not include a
structural break for the CAP policy change. Figure 13.1 displays a mean equation for
relative food prices. It demonstrates a long-run relationship between relative food prices
and the macroeconomic variables used in this study. RDEFY is the public deficit to
income ratio.
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FIGURE 13.1 Relative Food Prices as a Function of Macroeconomic variables (LR)

Source: Nicholas Apergis and Anthony Reziti, GARCH-X estimates, Greece case study, 2011,
Southern Agricultural Economics Association

The real money supply is denoted by rm, real exchange rates by re, and ypop denotes per
capita income. The results suggest a positive effect of deficits and exchange rates on food
prices in the long-run, and a negative impact by the money supply. These are consistent
with the literature reviewed on the global level. Moreover the Greece study takes this
analysis into the short run. In Greece, the short-run analysis with the GARCH-X model
found a positive effect for the error correction terms. Short-run deviations on the
conditional variance indicate an increased deviation between food prices and
macroeconomic variables is correlated with increases in food price volatility. Given the
current state of the Greek economy, the problematic fiscal position of Greece serves as a
dominant role in its macroeconomic environment. The study found that for Greece,
―Fiscal policies seem to exert a more powerful effect on relative food prices than policies
based on the monetary spectrum‖ (Apergis 2011). Thus we begin to see the power of a
case study, the usefulness of more specific and contextual analysis.
The Pakistan case study takes a very different approach in assessing the impact
and costs associated with food price shocks. In measuring caloric intakes of households,
the impact of food price shocks are compared across market bases under specific
contexts. Market vulnerability to food prices, climate change, and potential shocks are all
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profiled by region. For food prices the context is through indicators of market integration,
and price transmissions. Here the case used actual price increases from 2005/2006 and
2010/2011 across 20 commodity prices and wage rates in each providence (WFP 2011).
This information and other data are imputed into a simulation model. This model
―examines the impact of previous or potential shocks on household income, expenditure
and food consumption‖ (WFP 2011). Linking crop monitoring, and market monitoring,
with modules on income generation, budget allocation, and food consumption, the model
measures household responses to price changes.
A Scenario was on the model, in which recent flood events in 2010 were
combined to the baseline simulation developed with actual past price changes in Pakistan.
Results were not surprising, ―among urban livelihood groups, price increases had a larger
impact on households‘ undernourishment than floods‖ (WFP 2011). The higher the
income, the less the impact, ―the shock impact simulation shows that a larger proportion
of households of low income groups became undernourished as a result of price increases
in both rural (12.5 percentage points) and urban (9.0 percentage points)‖ (WFP 2011).
The flood shock only saw increases in undernourishment of low-income households in
rural areas. The breakdown of regional markets and their vulnerability to specific shocks
allow policymakers on the local level to safeguard against these impacts, and help create
meaningful steps to prevent potential increases in undernourishment of specific
households.
The recent price spikes held differences across regions of the globe. One case
study isolates Asia, and investigates the impact of food price inflation for Asian
Economies. China saw an increase in meat and poultry because of a disease in their pig
supply in 2007, this exacerbated food price spikes for China. Indonesia and Thailand
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experienced more rapid rates of rising cooking oil prices than other economies. Food
weights are 50% of the CPI for the Philippines, making larger shares of income being
allocated to food in the short-run. These are important considerations to follow up on
when discussing food price increases, local factors can be overshadowed by global
supply and demand fundamentals.
The study notes the importance of a credible monetary framework, as well as the
power of inflationary expectations to create a secondary effect on price increases. ―Based
on higher ex post inflation, consumers may form higher inflation expectations for the
future, and set prices and wages accordingly, generating second-round effects on
price‖(Cheung 2008). In observing food inflation rates outpacing general inflation rates
in the Asian economies, questions arose. Analyzing the impact of these recent food price
increases in relation to general inflation and further more economic growth became a
priority.
Using an augmented Phillips Curve, the Asian economies' relationships between
inflation and unemployment (an output gap in this case) mapped. A main point of concern
for this case study became the slowdown in economic activity and its role in future
inflationary pressures. The curve is estimated with inflation being a function of supply
shocks and the output gap. Included in the supply shocks are: past inflation, real effective
exchange rate, and changes in food prices. Theory presumes an increase in inflation will
be seen in regards to a widening output gap (underemployment of an economy's
resources), food price increases, and past inflation rates. An appreciation of the exchange
rate is seen as a decrease to inflation. The Phillips Curve estimation brought about a one
way analysis of the interactions food prices have on general inflation. They found, ― CPI
would increase by almost 2.5 percentage points after one year due only to the food-price
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increase in the first quarter of 2008‖ (Cheung 2008). This study takes food prices at face
value as an element in the overall inflation.
However, they recognize the background environment in which the higher food
prices took place. The persistent structural elements at work here are making prices
―sticky‖. Of particular importance to the region is the shift in demand structure, and the
inability of supply to keep up. That is in the short-run, and alarmingly even more so in
the long-run when the scarcities for land and water are more prevalent. Having separated
the region into newly industrialized economies, and the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) economies, further inferences were allowed in respect to monetary
regimes, and their effectiveness in managing inflation. The ASEAN countries would have
more buffers against increases in commodity prices, such as subsidies and other price
controls (Cheung 2008).
Vietnam, a major food exporter did not escape the recent price spikes.
Tung Phung Duc and Hermanm Waibel looked at the impact of food price increases on
welfare in Vietnam. Using disaggregated production, consumption, and price data from
households, they examined the impacts of food price changes on both households'
welfare and behavioral responses in the short-run. Vietnam's background and
demographic profile helps them to create a more accurate and specific analysis of the
impact recent food price spikes had on the rural, and the poor sectors of Vietnam. As a net
rice exporter, the world price increases would be perceived as beneficial for Vietnam.
However, the study allowed for a more thorough understanding of changes on the supply
side, costs of production have increased substantially.
They did find, as we have in our discussion, ―the reaction of the producers on the
supply side and consumer in demand side are moderately (except poor consumers)‖ (Duc
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2009). Price movements of food items were found to be heterogeneous among
Vietnamese households, as well as the food items themselves. It is their belief, that
current papers are then overestimating the impact of food prices on the incomes of
Vietnamese households. Equations for tracking the changes in net food incomes, as well
as for changes in food consumtion develope a net benefit ratio. The equations collect the
data and decipher changes in welfare due to the changes in food price. The decomposition
used allows for interactions between the changes in the prices and the changes in
quantities, the changes in price of self-produced food and purchsaed food can be
measured, even if they are the same type of food (Duc 2009).
Their results are as we would expect, net sellers gained, while net buyers lost. The
regional effects are consistent with these expectations. "On average, the welfare of the
households living in rural area increased about 12.7% while urban households lost about
8.0% of their welfare due to food price increase" (Duc 2009). The impact the food price
increase had on poverty was also distributed unevenly, as expected, food price increases
"reduced the poverty rate in net seller group only by 3.2 percentage points while it
increased the poverty rate of net buyers by 7.1 percentage point" (Duc 2009). Yet we
have to report here, there were areas in which decreases in poverty were seen, which is
consistent with the notion of food price increases being beneficial to farmers, the small
decreases in poverty were found in two regions where poor households participated in
rice production. High urban populations who import more tended to be the regions seeing
the most increases in poverty rates. Perhaps this serves as a justification to country's
reacting to higher world food prices with protectionist policies.
The study further examines the food price impact on welfare of these regions. In
following with the debate of food prices, the Vietnam study provides some evidence for
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the increases being good, on average, "the rising in food price increased the welfare of
the households in Vietnam by 7.5% and it is driven by the impact of the rising in rice
price" (Duc 2009). However, these findings should be looked at on a regional, perhaps
even household basis rather than as a whole. Middle-income groups saw the most
favorable outcomes with increases in food prices. The changes were mainly driven by
consumption adjustments, and their quantity and interaction effects were smaller than
their price effects. Perhsaps most importantly we see these welfare gains are not evenly
distributed, "the percentage of better-off people (gained) from the rising in food price and
rice price are smaller than the worseoff people (lost)" (Duc 2009). The number of poor
increased, and the welfare of the poor decreased. Here in vietnam we see the good versus
bate debate being realized. Gains from increases in food prices do not make for increases
in development, because of the inequality of those gains.
All of these case studies seem to end with disclaimers. For example the Asian
regional analysis warned readers, ―based on this finding, which is necessarily crude and
should be interpreted with caution, there may not be a meaningful reduction in the
inflation rate without policy tightening in the region‖(Cheung 2008). The dynamic nature
of the data and inherent stochastic behavior of the system make modeling complex. All of
the aforementioned conclusions have been supported by empirical findings. Empirical
means that are in themselves imperfect, and the data collection itself opens up room for
error. This brings into question our ability to capture the movements of prices in the
economy, their drivers, and ultimately their impacts.
Chapter 14: Modeling Capabilities
Let's not pretend our assumptions pit us in the real world, and these multilinear
regressions tell us something other than correlations. Economies encompass so many
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elements, dynamic elements. This complicates our ability to analyze what's happening at
any given time in an economy, let alone to make projections into the future. Economists
are notorious for their guesswork. However, we are not attempting to improve our models
in vain; modeling capabilities have improved since the days of Adam smith, and Malthus.
Except, what are our current models capturing? We know the drivers of the recent food
price spikes, are these factors being incorporated into the econometric models of today?
Models are needed not only to measure the price drivers, but also for forecasting
purposes. When approaching the world food crisis, there are several angles to asses the
global economic environment with. We can take a look at the price changes and their
affect on the economy, all the way to the household level and measure changes in
welfare. We could, like the Pakistan study use calorie intakes as a measurement of
vulnerability in the agricultural system. More in line with the World Bank we can use
decomposition methods to see the effects of policies on changes in domestic food prices.
Looking into the methods for decomposition further, William Liefert develops a method
for decomposing prices based off of the World Bank method (Liefert 2007).
Equation (1) below presents the World Bank's decomposition equation, after
converting to natural logs and differentiating with respect to time:

(1)
The residual, or the nominal protection coefficient,

, , measures the effect that

policy has on domestic prices, Pd.. The domestic price is decomposed by attributing its
changes to the changes in world prices, the real exchange rate's changes, and policy
changes. Essentially, this method is useful, in determining if the nominal protection rate
has changed after a policy of fixing domestic prices occurs. However, we lose out when
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the decomposed price is independent of the variables we use to decompose it.
This does not necessarily imply some other method is more useful in cases where
policy determines the real producer price for a country; it just means there is questionable
economic sense in decomposing the real producer price in such a case. The way around
this problem of transmission prevention is to make, yup you guessed it, and assumption.
If it is assumed the policy change was in response to changes in the world price and the
exchange rate, then the change found in domestic prices is attributed completely to those
changes in the world price and the exchange rate. Yet the relevance for the decomposition
comes more into play when policies allow for transmission, which is the current world
trend.
Except we can immediately spot a deficiency in the World Bank's method, there
are not any interactive multiplicative terms in equation (1). The attributions to changes in
the domestic price will be incorrectly allocated as being apart of policy affects, caught in
the residual. The assumption is made that these multiplicative terms are small enough to
be neglected. Thus the interaction they have on each other, while simultaneously
changing is assumed to be negligible. Liefert further denotes the World Bank method to
be amiss simply from its lack of information.
His revised method allows for more information to be included in the
decomposition process. The World Bank's method limits us to direct price effects and
policy effects, however there are plenty of other variables to attribute price changes to.
That much is evident from our earlier discussions. Poor infrastructures affect the market
in costly ways. Transportation costs can be rather high, with insufficient supply chains to
deliver a product to market. Isolation may not allow for the flow of price information to
reach a producer, thus they are merely unaware of the value of their products. Weak
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infrastructures are open to delayed payments, corruption, due to ―localized market power
by processors and distributors‖ (Liefert 2007), making the real value of their payments
decrease as the time passes with inflation. Poor infrastructures result in incomplete
transmission of exchange rate changes or world price changes on the domestic price.
Liefert's method takes these shortfalls into account, and has provided a revised
method. Equation (2) displays this revised version of the World Bank's decomposition
method:

(2)

It's advantage lies in its ability to ―allow one to isolate and measure the direct price effect,
policy effects (both explicit and implicit), and incomplete transmission effect on Pd‖
(Liefert 2007).Looking at equation 2, t represents a tariff rate. Term C captures the
changes in the domestic price, Pd as a result of the price effect occurring from the
changes in the world price and real exchange rates. D measures the changes from explicit
and implicit policy effects, and in terms E and F, measure the change in the domestic
price resulting from incomplete transmission. Altogether the revised method captures
affects on the domestic price as a result from changes in the world price or exchange rate
combined with incomplete transmission; noting the policy actions may have less to do
with the price change than the deficient market infrastructure (Liefert 2007).
Even so the decompositions mentioned do not seem to be able to provide adequate
projections or even hold much information on an economy. We should move into
methods in which we are housing data in matrices with vectors interacting rather than
limiting ourselves to the assumptions of a small country with limited market power as the
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revised World Bank method does. Before jumping to a full scale stochastic dynamic
programmed model it is useful to mention measures of volatility and shocks.
Techniques available for measuring volatility include: ARIMA modeling, VAR
Models (Vector Autoregression), Vector Error-Correction Models, and exponential
smoothing. These models allow for a better analysis of shocks to the system and
projections into the future than the aforementioned decomposition methods. Forecasting
food prices becomes of the utmost importance when we see the effect of food policy
reforms on economies resulting in hunger. It is not the job of this paper to describe or
inform readers as to the workings of Vector Autoregressions, and their subsequent
impulse response functions that result. However, in mentioning the capabilities of
modeling in assessing food price increases we will discuss their capabilities and
shortfalls, but under a presumption of minimal familiarity with the topic.
There are a few advantages to using VAR models, they are a simple way of
forecasting. Arguably, they are fairly accurate for how simple they are. They are easily
programmed, often have a small amount of variables, and are thus updated quickly.
Possibly seen as a disadvantage, they do not have to estimate as many parameters as
larger models. Not enough information or expertise is not a problem; VAR models just
avoid this altogether. Of course if you are operating outside of the pure form and require
subjective add factors, then you lose this avoidance convenience. Two disadvantages are
the multicollinearity when dealing with lagged values of time series data, and the
inability to reflect relationships well when the number of variables is increased. Perhaps
not the most effective form of forecasting, but sometimes the quick, easy, cheaper way is
just as good if not better than the large model expensive, and time consuming methods
(Schlegel 2011).
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From a methodological point of view, both partial and general equilibrium models
can be used to assess the impact of an increase in prices on households. Thus we should
expand away from measures of volatility and measures of price decomposition and
stretch further into what we are really after, the effect these changes in price will have on
well being, and the future implications these price drivers will have in terms of costs and
continued price spikes. AGLINK/COSIMO, IMPACT, FAPRI, and FASOM present as
useful partial equilibrium models. The OECD made projections on the impacts of 2006
biofuel policy targets. Their studies used the AGLINK and COSIMO models in several
countries, finding a 2% price increase for oilseeds, but a near 60% increase in sugar
prices by 2014. Msangi et al. Used the IMPACT model to simulate the impact of biofuels
on regional food prices. In a scenario depicting rapid global growth in biofuel production,
operating with current conversion technologies, results showed 30-76% increases in
major crop's prices by 2020. Meanwhile, malnutrition in Sub Saharan Africa was
significantly large (Msangi 2007).
With partial models we are missing a big part of the picture, resources are finite.
Such a strong theme throughout this paper, land, labor, and capital are constrained in the
real world. Households have budget constraints, hence the whole premise of world
hunger occurring. People are unable to gain access to food. These finite limitations are
overcome by moving to a general equilibrium approach, or a Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE). Here we can use real world economic data put into Walrasian's
theoretical framework, to reach equilibrium levels of supply, demand, and prices.
Applications of CGEs spun out from finance and trade into the new frontiers of energy
and biofuel policies. Impacts of green house gas policies are among the capable realms of
analysis. Recent biofuel studies used CGEs: USAGE, LINKAGE, and GTAP
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Hertel 2002
The models above begin to branch out into models that account for climate
change. The DICE-2010 model (Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy Model)
incorporates climate change under neoclassical growth theory constructs. Refraining from
consumption today is done only to increase consumption tomorrow. A term for ―natural
capital‖ is introduced, in which pollution emissions are a negative to the account. The
model itself is comprised of a global aggregation of countries' output, capital stock, gas
emissions, and technology. There exists a world social welfare function outlining
preferences. Consumption is tied to population, making consumption increases larger
than population increases a negative. Two normative parameters, ―the pure rate of time
preference and the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption‖ (Nordhaus 2010)
allocate the importance of a generation. Together these parameters set the discount rate
for goods, which we know to be a critical element in inter-temporal economic choices.
However, these parameters need set to be consistent with economic outcomes.
The model allows for economic and geophysical constraints. Decision variables
include: overall savings rate for physical capital, and a GHG emissions control rate. A
single commodity is used for either consumption or investment. The model encourages
consumption to ―be viewed broadly to include not only food and shelter but also nonmarket environmental amenities and services‖ (Nordous 2010). Technology and
population growth are exogenous and region specific. Capital accumulation is found
through optimizing consumption flows over time. Using purchasing power parity
exchange rates the regional outputs and capital stocks are aggregated. Output itself is
determined via a Cobb-Douglas production function that involves not just labor and
capital but also energy. Energy is classified as either carbon-based or non-carbon based.
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The advantage of this DICE model is it's incorporation of geophysical
relationships within the economy. A few of these relationships are: ―the carbon cycle, a
radiative forcing equation, climate-change equations, and a climate-damage relationship‖
(Nordous 2010). Computations for the model use the CONOPT solver in GAMS, based
on the GRG (generalized reduced gradient) algorithm. With 1263 equations and 1381
variables the model finds a global optimum. The RICE model is the regional breakdown
of the DICE model. The model even includes a sea level rising damage function. This
model is the sixth version of the DICE model, making it evident that the field is adapting
to new discoveries in geophysical relationships, and making use of integrated analysis in
economic modeling.
A chapter on modeling capabilities with regards to food prices is not complete
without discussing the CARD-FAPRI model of world agricultural markets. This system
of agricultural supply and demand curves is updated each year. The model is solved for
world and some country specific, ―market-clearing prices‖ for dairy, beef, swine, poultry,
and of course major crops. They phase in changes, policies and even new special features.
One feature allowing for a fertilizer module.
Yet there are some setbacks, corn is corn, the system does not model product
differentiation. It also assumes that acreage responds to price, but not yields. Another
pitfall, it has this annual time step where markets clear each year, as mentioned. Long-run
equilibrium conditions are capable of being imposed. A similar model, GTAP allows for
some product differentiation, and assumes yield and acres are responsive to prices. GTAP
moves from one equilibrium to another, unlike the yearly time step of FAPRI. Perhaps the
most important difference, GTAP is run by many countries (US included), while the
CARD/FAPRI can only be run by the US (Babcock 2011; ISU 2011). It seems we have in
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our arsenal of models some fairly capable tools for capturing the impacts of changes
within the economy.
Modeling may not be able to pinpoint the exact percentages of food price
increases and allocate them accordingly to the mixed bag of factors that came into play
across this past decade. However, we have elaborate dynamic models complete with
GHG emissions, sea level rises, land uses and fertilizer uses; it appears price
decomposition of recent price spikes would be capable given these tools. It becomes of
great concern here to stress the quality of the data. The models can be better than ever
before, without quality data the results are worthless. Thus we are improving in all
manners. Stakeholders have information available for them, but often the results of a
scenario in a data do not hold as much weight as a lobbyist. There remains imperfections
in the market, ones the models are incapable of including. Uncertainty continues to haunt
out will to predict the future.
Chapter 15: Conclusion
Many misconceptions surround the recent price spikes, and food security in
general for that matter. It is a result of the mechanistic world view adopted via short-run
economic profit driven societies. The state of the world is our doing. Tv shows are
capitalizing on our lack of self control when it comes to consumption. ―Terra Nova‖ a
recently debuted television series depicts a family in the future being penalized for
having a third child. Everywhere someone travels they wear an air filter mask; the smog
has taken over the skies. The sight of an orange is rare and children have never seen stars.
A reality we are headed towards in our current state. Saying this at the risk of being
labeled a naysayer, overcrowding is an existential problem. The stress on our
environment is perhaps more of an issue than the sheer numbers of people.
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If you would much rather live in bliss and continue on in your current state of
consumption, this paper may have been difficult for you to swallow. I would be
impressed if you could walk away from the rest of this conclusion without an era of
depression and desperation. Materialistic consumption hungry societies are eating away
at natural resources. It's a good thing the developing world is not like the US, we would
need four planets the size of Earth to feed this consumption rate. The US, with less than 5
percent of the world's population consumes over 30 percent of the globe's raw materials.
The exploitation of our Earth is leading towards biological and environmental collapse.
Scared yet? You should be, coal, crude oil, wetlands, and arable land, all nonrenewable,
we are culprits in the exploitation. This leads us to evolve, find new energy sources, to
reverse the effects of our exploitation.
Yet the consumption rates seem to have run away with our greed before we
understood the consequences. In this I sympathize on the side of the hypocrites. How can
I maintain my current lifestyle without exploiting the scarce resources? I am certain many
are inclined to tune out long before reaching this point in a human destruction lecture. No
one likes to hear this part, we all are responsible and have to change in order to help the
planet part. Not putting myself on a pedestal here, I drove my car today, performed acts
of gluttony over Thanksgiving, and used more than my fair share of hot water to shower.
My consumption levels are not justified; my actions have an impact on the world's food
security. Granted I am not as much of a culprit as Monsanto, Syngenta, Cargill, or Con
Agra. Regardless being conscious of our environment is a step in the right direction.
Being conscious of the social, ecological, and economic environment in which we
live is important for us, the human race. The recent price spikes are tribute to our
changing environment. Our modeling capabilities are capturing the findings of current
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literature; however there is always room for improvement. And as such matters bring up
the question of quality data; the agencies in charge of data collection are imperfect. All of
it, imperfect, after all we are navigating through a realm of economics incorporating
virtually everything we can from human behavior to weather patterns. Of course there is
going to be uncertainty in the results.
Current literature leads us to see recent food price spikes as the interaction of
supply and demand fundamentals under a dynamic macroeconomic and agricultural
economic environment. Our best determinations as to the magnitude of recent price
spikes were presented throughout the chapters in a somewhat contradictory pattern. That
is we cannot definitively go through and pick and choose which studies provide us with
the most accurate quantities. One could argue this as a possibility; however the time and
ambiguity involved would become much clearer upon performing the beginnings of such
an action. We do know, no one factor can take the blame for the cause of the global food
crisis, but ―root causes have been structural adjustment, free trade, and policies extracting
surplus from agriculture for industrialization, all of which have destroyed or eroded the
agriculture sector of many countries‖ (Bello 2009). Experience here tells us we are
presented with information, empirical and otherwise. With which we draw inferences
from, and consequently construct a belief pattern in response to these findings.
This thesis has provided stakeholders with a readily available arsenal of current
literature on the recent food price spikes. A discussion on the influential elements on food
prices presented us with factors responsible for long-term upward trends in prices, as well
as those unique to the recent price spikes. Specific case studies demonstrate the manners
with which price decomposition and impacts of recent prices are analyzed contextually.
The complexity of recent food price spikes calls into question our current modeling
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capabilities. Of which we discussed and find adequacy is also specific to individual case
studies, and their empirical wants. That is the modeling framework should be chosen to
best fit the needs of specific works. Some models capture a wide array of dynamic data,
others provide simple projections. If anything a policymaker at least knows their options.
The information, and tools presented in this paper allow stakeholders to make more
knowledgeable choices in response to the recent food price spikes. As well as provide a
base for potential future reactions to food price increases.
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APPENDIX
A. Production Charts
FIGURE 3.8 Wheat Area, Yield, and Production (October 12, 2011)

Source: USDA (2011) Foreign Agriculture Service; PS&D online database

FIGURE 3.9 Corn Area, Yield, and Production (October 12, 2011)
Source: USDA (2011) Foreign Agriculture Service; PS&D online database

FIGURE 3.10 Barley Area, Yield, and Production
Source: USDA (2011) Foreign Agriculture Service; PS&D online database
FIGURE 3.11 Rice Area, Yield, and Production

Source: USDA (2011) Foreign Agriculture Service; PS&D online database

FIGURE 3.13 Soybean Area, Yield, and Production

Source: USDA (2011) Foreign Agriculture Service; PS&D

online database
FIGURE 3.14 Sorghum Area, Yield, and Production

Source: USDA (2011) Foreign Agriculture Service; PS&D online database

B. Land Grab Ownership Links (2008)

Source: Edwards, Charlie.―Monday's Map Returns‖ 2008;http://www.globaldashboard.org/tag/biofuels/
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C. Seed Industry Map
http://www.naturalnews.com/files/seedindustry.pdf
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D. Price Ending Stocks Data 200-2010

Source: IMF Primary Commodity Prices, https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.asp
USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, http://www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/psdhome.aspx
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E. Layout of Price Increase Drivers and Their Relative Importance
Mechanism

Effects on Food Prices
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and environmental stress, increased yields, increased exposure to crop diseases, pests, and fungi.

Adverse weather conditions Droughts, Floods, Hurricanes,
Water Availability

depletion of nonrenewable water sources, deeper well drilling, irrigation, run-off contamination, disruption of
natural water flows, corporate takeover of water supplies, access to water decreasing, water wars

Land Availability Land Grabbing, Land Use Changes,
Climate Change Wetland Drainage, increased adverse weather spikes,
Input Prices Energy Intensive Agriculture: oil, fertilizer, and seed costs all increased
DEMAND
Biofuel Production Increased Demand, mainly for corn, and sugar.
Income Growth Emerging economies are experiencing an income effect, shifting diets
Population Growth increases in population growth rates across time, increased demand for all food products
MACROECONOMY
Macroeconomic Variables

Dollar Appreciation and Depreciation Effects, Terms of trade changes for countries, Inflationary expectations,
money supply, public deficits

Increase Speculation Increased amount of Index Fund investment into agriculture markets

biofuel policies, trade policies, fiscal and monetary policies, policies of abundances,
policies of shortages, WTO goals, high export tariffs, export bans

POLICIES

+

MARKET STUCTURE
Lack of an efficient logistics systems increased costs of distribution, poor supply chain
Weak institutions

Political environments providing instability for food prices, inflationary expectations and civil order, undermining of
agricultural investments

More I nelastic Supply and Demand Supply and demand elements combined to decrease the elasticity in food markets
Global financial turmoil Unemployment, decreased investment, lower consumption, lower economic growth rates
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